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COMMENT
From Russia with Love: The Legal
Repercussions of the Recruitment and
Contracting of Foreign Players in the
National Hockey League
JEFFREY P. GLEASONt
The introduction to New York Times columnist Thomas
L. Friedman's 1999 book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, is
titled "Opening Scene: The World is Ten Years Old."1 With
that name, Friedman was referring to the modern age of
globalized societies and economies, which he posited began
in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall.2 Several years after
the release of Friedman's book, it is undeniable that nations
now operate in an international forum, not only
diplomatically but economically and socially as well. It is
not only nations that operate in this globalized manner, but
also individuals, a phenomenon that Friedman termed
t J.D. Candidate, 2008, University at Buffalo; B.A., 2004, University of South
Carolina. First, I must thank my family and friends who always push me to do,
and be, better than the day before. I would also like to thank Professor
Elizabeth Mensch for sparking my interest in antitrust law and for her
extremely helpful editorial comments. My thanks must also go to Tatiana
Markel for her translations of Russian sources, without which I would have
been lost. Finally, this Comment would never have been written had it not been
for my deep love of the Buffalo Sabres, who have continually taught me the
meaning of the phrase "next year."
1. THoMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE, at xi (1999).
2. Id. at 7-8.
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"Super-empowered individuals."3 While Friedman did not
address it in his book, professional sports have followed the
same path as nations, individuals, and economies in taking
on an increasingly international character, one that no
longer exists solely in Olympic competition.
This Comment will examine some of the legal
consequences that American professional sports leagues
and teams may incur by recruiting and signing players
from foreign countries. An example of such consequences is
the recent lawsuit brought by two Russian hockey teams
against the National Hockey League (NHL) that alleged,
inter alia, violations of the antitrust laws and tortious
interference with contractual and business relations. 4 That
lawsuit, the circumstances surrounding its filing, and the
subsequent related events will serve as the lens of this
Comment, restricting its scope to the present consequences
faced by the NHL with particular attention paid to Russian
hockey players. This Comment will examine the claims
made in that lawsuit as well as the legal bases for those
claims as established through statutory and common law.5
That analysis will then be expanded to show that the
simple maintenance of the status quo in the NHL with
regard to international players will create persistent legal
problems for both the league and its teams.
In Part I, I will set the stage for the conflict by
providing introductory and background information about
the NHL, the parties to the lawsuit, and the complaint filed
by one of the Russian hockey teams. In Part II, I will
develop the statutory and common law under which the
Russian hockey team's claims would be analyzed, while in
Part III, I will develop the corresponding law for the claims
of tortious interference with contractual and business
relations. Part IV will consist of a specific analysis of the
3. Id. at 12-13.
4. See infra note 62.
5. It must be noted at this time that this lawsuit against the NHL was
dismissed on January 29, 2007. See infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
However, an analysis will be made as if the same had not been so dismissed to
show the potential validity of those claims. This is done because, as will be
argued later, the legal issues presented by this lawsuit, and the analysis given
those issues, remain and a similar lawsuit may arise in the future, given the
current legal landscape and Russia's refusal of yet another player transfer
agreement. See infra notes 251-58 and accompanying text.
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claims made by the Russian hockey teams in light of the
legal rules and precedent set forth in Parts II and III.
Lastly, in Part V, I will argue that, in light of the current
relations between American and Russian hockey teams, as
well as the international governing body for the sport, the
National Hockey League will continue to face similar legal
challenges unless it changes its policy toward the
recruitment of foreign players. Part V will also offer one
possible solution to this conflict that could be incorporated
into the current, or a future, player transfer agreement that
may satisfy all parties involved.
I. THE STAGE IS SET
'I have for some time been thinking that it would be a
good thing if there were a challenge cup which should be
held from year to year by the champion hockey team in the
Dominion."' 6 That was the message delivered by Lord
Kilcoursie 7 at a March 18, 1892 dinner of the Ottawa
Amateur Athletic Association on behalf of Lord Stanley, the
Earl of Preston and Governor General of Canada.8 Lord
Stanley proposed, and shortly thereafter purchased, one of
the most sought after trophies in all of professional sports
that still today bears his name: the Stanley Cup. 9 While
Lord Stanley never saw his trophy presented, 10 hockey
players from around the world still dream of someday
playing in the NHL and having their names engraved on
the Stanley Cup.
A. The NHL Starts Out, Reaches Out, and Locks Out
The NHL was founded on November 26, 1917 with only
five franchises, all of which were located in Canada."
6. NHL.com, The Stanley Cup, http://www.nhl.com/cup/cup.html (last
visited Apr. 13, 2008) (quoting Lord Kilcoursie).
7. Lord Kilcoursie was a player for the Ottawa Rebels hockey club. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id.
10. Id. (explaining that Lord Stanley returned to England before the
completion of the 1893 season, the first in which the Stanley Cup was awarded).
11. See NHL.com, History, http://www.nhl.com/history/l12617nhl.html (last
visited Apr. 13, 2008).
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Today, however, the NHL is comprised of thirty teams
divided into two conferences and spread across both Canada
and the United States. 12 Each year, executives from these
teams assemble to draft new hockey players into the NHL,''a spectacle anticipated by hundreds of thousands of hockey
fans throughout the world."13 For much of its early
existence, though, the NHL and the entry draft were
populated nearly entirely by North American-born players. 14
The NHL began to change more rapidly around 1981,
when more and more international players started to enter
the NHL draft' 5 and bring the European style of hockey to
North America.' 6 During the 2005-2006 NHL season, 262
European-born players suited up for NHL teams,' 7 while 74
additional players agreed to transfer to NHL teams, from
12. See NHL.com, Teams, http://www.nhl.com/teams/index.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2008).
13. NHL.com, Futures: NHL Entry Draft, http://www.nhl.com/futures/
drafthistory.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2008). While the first NHL Amateur
Draft was held in Montreal on June 5, 1963, the draft has undergone
subsequent eligibility changes in 1969, 1979, 1980, 1987, and 1992, and is now
named the NHL Entry Draft. See id. All eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-
old players born both inside and outside of North America are eligible to be
drafted. Id. Also, non-North American-born players aged twenty-one and older
are eligible for the NHL draft. Id. Since 2000, approximately 290 players are
drafted in the NHL Entry Draft each year. NHL.com, Futures: Entry Draft
Summary, http://www.nhl.com/futures/draftsummary.html (last visited Apr. 13,
2008).
14. In 1965, Ulf Sterner became the first European player to join the NHL
when he appeared on the New York Rangers' roster on January 27. A to Z
Encyclopedia of Ice Hockey, http://www.azhockey.com/index.html (follow "Firsts
Gallery" hyperlink located in the text box on the left side of the screen) (last
visited Apr. 13, 2008). The first time a European player was drafted by an NHL
team did not occur until four years later in 1969. Id.; see also Larry Wigge, New
World Order, SPORTING NEWS, Feb. 25, 2002, at 24, 25 ("A quarter-century ago,
90 percent of the players in the NHL were born in North America.").
15. NHL.com, Futures: Entry Draft Summary, http://www.nhl.com/futures/
draftsummary.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (showing that between the 1980
and 1981 drafts, the number of players drafted from abroad increased from
6.2% to 15.2% of all players drafted).
16. See Wigge, supra note 14 (opining that Finnish-born Jari Kurri's playing
partnership with hockey great Wayne Gretzky "was the first step toward
hockey globalization: Kurri Europeanized Gretzky; Gretzky did not North
Americanize Kurri").
17. Bill Meltzer, Austrians Stride Forward in North American, International
Play, NHL.coM, June 8, 2006, Across the Pond, http://www.nhl.com/features/
pond/austria060806.html.
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their International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) teams,
during the 2006 off-season.18 Additionally, the reverse of
this pattern was seen during the 2004 NHL Lockout, 19
when 388 NHL players temporarily left North America to
play in nineteen different European leagues. 20 Evidently,
when the Cold War ended and economies began to operate
without borders, so did the NHL.
In both 2006 and 2007, however, the entry draft
retreated a bit from its highly diversified international
character. In 2006, a record ten out of the thirty total draft
picks in the first round were players from the United
States.2' That trend continued in the 2007 entry draft when
another ten U.S.-born players were selected in the first
round, including both the first and second draft picks-the
first time that has happened in the history of the draft.22
Including those first round picks, 63 U.S.-born players were
selected in the 2007 draft, accounting for a record thirty
percent of the 211 total draft picks. 23 While Canadian-born
18. IIHF News, List of Signed European Players by NHL Clubs for 2006-
2007 Season, http://www.iihf.com/news/iihfpr5106.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2006). The high point of the influx of European players was in the 2001-2002
NHL season, when 30.0%, or 293 out of 968 NHL players, were European.
INTERNATIONAL ICE HOCKEY FEDERATION, STUDY ON EUROPEANS GOING TO NORTH
AMERICA 5 (2006) [hereinafter IIHF STUDY]. During the draft that preceded that
year, 49.1% of the players drafted were European. Id. at 6.
19. On September 16, 2004, the day after the collective bargaining
agreement between the NHL and the NHL Players' Association-the players'
union-expired, the league experienced a work stoppage termed a "lockout." Joe
Lapointe, Lockout is First Shot in Hockey's Labor War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2004, at Dl. On February 16, 2005, NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman
cancelled the entire 2004-2005 hockey season, the only season since 1919 in
which the Stanley Cup was not awarded. Joe Lapointe, League Cancels Hockey
Season in Labor Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2005, at Al.
20. IIHF News, Lockout List Ends at 388 NHL Players in Europe as of
February 25, http://www.iihf.com/news/iihfpr8704.htm (last visited Aug, 8,
2007).
21. Kevin Allen, American First-Rounders Could Break 2006 Record, USA
TODAY, June 22, 2007, at 15C.
22. Donna Spencer, Stars and Stripes Flies High, U.S. Passes Europe,
Becomes Canada's Big Rival at NHL Draft, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, June 24,
2007, at C5. Patrick Kane, from Buffalo, N.Y.-namely, my own hometown of
South Buffalo-was selected first overall while James vanRiemsdyk, from
Middletown, N.J., was selected second. Kane Becomes Second Straight U.S.-
Born Player Selected First, ESPN.COM, June 22, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.
com/nhlldraft2007/news/story?id=2913585.
23. Spencer, supra note 22.
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players continue to dominate the draft, 24 the increase in
American hockey players in recent years is staggering.
"Where there were once Russians, Czechs, Slovaks and
Swedes crowding Canadians in the prospect pool, there are
now kids from New Jersey, Minnesota, Michigan, Illinois
and even California. ' 25 While this "home-grown" character
of the NHL draft may be due to the growth of the U.S.
National Team Development Program,26 it likely also has
much to do with the expense and difficulty teams encounter
when attempting to pull their draft picks away from their
international teams and into the NHL.
In 2001, in order to facilitate the global movement of
hockey players, the NHL, together with the National
Hockey League Players Association (NHLPA),27 reached an
agreement with the IIHF and its member hockey
associations to regulate the transfer of players from IIHF
affiliated leagues to the NHL--and, occasionally, vice
versa.28 The Player Transfer Agreement stipulated that,
upon the signing of a player from a European team, the
NHL team would compensate the player's former team with
a developmental fee.29 During the term of that agreement,
from 2001 to 2004, 185 players transferred to the NHL from
IIHF associated leagues, and US$28.8 million in
compensation was paid by NHL teams. 30
24. See id. (explaining that 102, or roughly forty-eight percent, of the 211
draft picks in 2007 were Canadian-born players).
25. Id. Spencer noted that three players from California and one from
Texas-not traditional hockey havens due to their warm climates-were
drafted in 2007. Id.
26. See Allen, supra note 21.
27. The NHLPA, or players' union, is "recognized as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of present and future [p]layers in the NHL."
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION pmbl. (2005). [hereinafter
NHL-NHLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT].
28. See IIHF News, Zherdev Last Player to Sign Under Expiring IIHF-NHL-
NHLPA Deal, http://www.iihf.com/news/iihfpr4003.htm (last visited Oct. 21,
2006).
29. See id.
30. Id. A subsequent report from the IIHF counted 194 player transfers
under the 2001-2004 agreement. IIHF News, IIHF-NHL Player Transfer
Agreement Involving Six Euro Countries, http://www.iihf.com/news/iihfpr8405.htm
(last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
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Following the 2004-2005 lockout, the NHL, NHLPA,
and IIHF once again began negotiating the terms of a new
Player Transfer Agreement. A two-year agreement was
reached on August 16, 2005 that included the NHL and the
national hockey associations of the Czech Republic,
Finland, Germany, Sweden, Slovakia, and Switzerland. 31
However, Russia did not agree with the financial
compensation, transfer limit, and transfer deadline
provisions in the agreement and refused to be a part of it.32
This was especially significant for the NHL since fifty-one
native Russians played on NHL teams during the 2005-
2006 season, 33 and the rights to forty-one Russian players
were transferred to the NHL under the old Player Transfer
Agreement. 34  The result was a very tumultuous
relationship between the NHL and the Russian Ice Hockey
Federation during the term of the Player Transfer
Agreement-one that resulted in a bitter exchange of words
in the press and a good deal of litigation.
In May 2007, "[r]epresentatives of the NHL, NHL
Player's Association, the IIHF, and the seven top European
player-producing nations [met] at a downtown Moscow
hotel" hoping to reach a new, mutually agreeable Player
Transfer Agreement, to which Russia would be a part, as
the previous agreement was about to expire.3 5 The parties
seemed optimistic that Russia would sign this Player
Transfer Agreement, even if reluctantly, "ending a two-year
boycott that threatened to throw the sport into chaos."36 A
new agreement was drafted providing that the NHL teams
would contribute ten to twelve million U.S. dollars to an
IIHF transfer pool that would go to pay a $200,000
developmental fee for each European player signed by an
NHL team. 37 However, that deal could not be finalized as
31. IIHF News, IIHF-NHL Player Transfer Agreement Involving Six Euro
Countries, http://www.iihf.com/news/iihfpr8405.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
32. Id.
33. See IIHF STUDY, supra note 18, at 5.
34. See IIHF News, IIHF-NHL Player Transfer Agreement Involving Six
Euro Countries, supra note 30.






Russian Ice Hockey Federation president, and Hall of Fame
NHL goaltender, Vladislav Tretiak mysteriously did not
show up to the meeting. 38 IIHF president Rene Fasel
announced that Russia would have until midnight on May 8
to ratify the agreement. 39 In what appeared to be
exasperation, Fasel stated that ."[the Russians] know
exactly what is going on, we have been discussing for many
months the proposal and they know exactly the numbers
and figures and conditions and just have to say yes or no."'
40
As the May 8 midnight deadline approached, Tretiak
reported that "80 percent of his nation's clubs were
dissatisfied with the terms" of the agreement, but that he
hoped further negotiations would yield agreeable terms.
41
However, as the deadline passed it became apparent that
Russia would not be a part of this new Player Transfer
Agreement. Tretiak expressed his distaste with the
agreement-the NHL itself posted an article on its website
stating, "Russian teams would rather lose players to the
NHL for nothing than sign a contract that pays them what
they consider a disrespectful amount of money, according to
[Tretiak]. '"42 As will be shown, Russia's rejection of this new
Player Transfer Agreement will continue to cause legal and
financial headaches for NHL teams that recruit and sign
Russian players.
B. The Cast of Characters
In the 2004 NHL draft, Evgeni Malkin, an eighteen-
year-old hockey player from Magnitogorsk, Russia, was
selected by the Pittsburgh Penguins as the second overall
pick, behind fellow Russian Alexander Ovechkin. 43 Malkin,
38. See Transfer Deal Still Might Get Ratified on Tuesday, ESPN.CoM, May
5, 2007, http:/sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2861222#.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting IIHF president Rene Fasel).
41. Russian Hockey Prez Says Clubs Not Happy with Deal, ESPN.coM, May
8, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2863744.
42. Russians Turn Down Transfer Agreement, Club Teams Want More
Respect, NHL.CoM, May 9, 2007, http://www.nhl.com/nhl/app?articleid=
305462&page=NewsPage&service=page. Russian teams lost thirteen players
without compensation as a result of not being a part of the previous transfer
agreement. See id.
43. NHL.com, Futures: NHL Entry Draft, http://www.nhl.com/nhl/
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however, was under contract with the Metallurg
Magnitogorsk (Metallurg) through the 2007-2008 hockey
season,44 and he continued to play for Metallurg during the
2004-2005 season that was cancelled due to the lockout. 45
When Russia declined the NHL-IIHF Player Transfer
Agreement in 2005, Malkin continued to play for Metallurg
through the 2005-2006 season.46 During that season,
Malkin was third in scoring in the Russian Super League
and, with Ovechkin already playing for the Capitals, 47 was
considered to be the best player not playing in the NHL.48
Despite Malkin's existing contract with Metallurg and
the lack of a Player Transfer Agreement with the Russian
Ice Hockey Federation, the Penguins began contract
negotiations with Malkin's agent in August 2006. 4 9 While
the Russian Ice Hockey Federation attempted to negotiate a
transfer fee for Malkin, the NHL refused to negotiate
beyond those fees set by the IIHF in the Player Transfer
Agreement. 50 Instead, the NHL instituted the policy that:
app?service=page&page=DraftStats&year=2004&round=l (last visited Apr. 13,
2008). Alexander Ovechkin was drafted by the Washington Capitals, id., and
won the Calder Trophy as the NHL's Rookie of the Year for the 2005-2006
season. John McGourty, Ovechkin Wins Calder Trophy in a Runaway,
NHL.cOM, June 22, 2006, http://www.nhl.com/nhl/app?service=page&page=
NewsPage&articleid=279601. Ovechkin was also the first rookie since 1991 to
be selected to the NHL First All-Star Team. Id. However, Ovechkin's entrance
into the NHL was not without legal troubles, as will be discussed later. See
infra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
44. Karen Price, Pens, Malkin's to Open Talks, PiTT. TRIB.-REV., Aug. 3,
2006, at C24.
45. See NHL.com Players, Evgeni Malkin, http://www.nhl.com/nhl/app?
service=page&page=PlayerDetail&playerId=8471215&tab=crst (last visited Apr.
15, 2008).
46. See Alan Robinson, Malkin Thought to be Safe, but Whereabouts
Unknown, Aug. 14, 2006, http://www.nhl.com/news/2006/08/278748.html.
47. Ovechkin's entrance into the NHL was also marred by litigation, though.
See infra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
48. See Price, supra note 44.
49. See id.
50. See id. (noting the Russian Ice Hockey Federation's position that, given
Malkin's hockey stardom in Russia, the US$200,000 flat fee was unacceptable);
see also Shelly Anderson, Malkin: Russian Team Takes Case To Court, PITT.
POST-GAZETrE, Nov. 14, 2006, at D1 (citing Metallurg's position that the NHL
should negotiate a transfer fee for each individual Russian player, as is done
with player transfers in European soccer leagues). Reportedly, Sergey
Arutyunyan, general director of the Russian Ice Hockey Federation, sent an e-
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If the player can secure his own release, either pursuant to the
terms of his existing Russian contract or pursuant to applicable
Russian law, NHL clubs will be free to sign such player, and the
resulting NHL contract will be registered and approved as valid
for play in the NHL.
5 1
Additionally, to further complicate the situation,
Malkin and Metallurg reached a new one-year contract on
August 7, 2006 for the 2006-2007 hockey season, modifying
his previously existing contract, described above. 5
2
Despite what appeared to be a resolution of the dispute,
Malkin quietly slipped away from the Metallurg team when
it arrived in Helsinki, Finland for training camp on August
12, 2006. 53 Malkin stayed in Helsinki with one of his agents
until he could gain clearance to enter the United States.
54
Malkin then spent two weeks in Los Angeles, California
before traveling to Pittsburgh and signing an entry-level
NHL contract with the Penguins on September 5, 2006.
55
Shortly thereafter, an arbitration committee of the Russian
Ice Hockey Federation ruled on September 15, 2006 that
Malkin violated his contract with Metallurg and that
Malkin could not play for any other hockey team in the
Russian Federation or abroad.56 Malkin was neither
present nor represented at the arbitration hearing. 57
Notably, while space precludes substantial analysis, similar
situations exist regarding Russian players Andrei
mail to NHL Deputy Commissioner Bill Daly demanding US$1 million "as
compensation for Malkin playing for the Penguins." Kevin Allen, Notes:
Russians Lose Injunction Claim Over Malkin, USATODAY.coM, Nov. 16, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/nhl/2006-11-16-notes-malkin-court-ruling_
x.htm?loc=interstitialskip.
51. Price, supra note 44 (quoting NHL Deputy Commissioner Bill Daly).
52. See Larry Neumeister, Russian Club Seeks to Stop Penguins Rookie
Sensation Malkin from Playing, USATODAY.COM, Oct. 19, 2006, http://www.
usatoday.comlsports/hockey/nhl/penguins/2006-10-19-malkin-lawsuitx.htm.
53. See Robinson, supra note 46. After leaving the team in Helsinki, Malkin
allegedly faxed the team a two-week notice that he was terminating his labor
contract. Whether such notice is sufficient will be discussed later in this
Comment. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
54. See Anderson, supra note 50.
55. See id.
56. Jason Cato & Karen Price, Arbitration Committee Rules Against Malkin,
PIrr. TRIB.-REV., Sept. 16, 2006, at C4.
57. Id.
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Taratukhin of the Calgary Flames and Alexei Mikhonov of
the Edmonton Oilers. On September 9, 2006, a Russian
arbitration committee ruled that Taratukhin and Mikhonov
violated their respective contracts with the Russian team
Lokomotiv Yaroslavl by going to the NHL.58
On October 19, 2006, Metallurg filed a lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the District of Manhattan
against the NHL and the Penguins. 59  However, on
November 16, 2006, Metallurg's request for a preliminary
injunction was denied by Judge Loretta A. Preska for
failure to show irreparable harm.60
C. The Stakes Rise: Metallurg's Complaint
As is the case in many areas of law, a discussion of the
merits of Metallurg's lawsuit requires an analysis of the
actual allegations laid out in the complaint filed by
Metallurg.6 1 Additionally, while Metallurg alleges seven
causes of action in its complaint, most are outside the scope
of this Comment and will not be addressed or considered. 62
58. Id.
59. See Neumeister, supra note 52. Malkin is not personally named in the
suit. Id. Notably, if Malkin were named, Metallurg could not have brought the
suit based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
60. See Denis Gorman, Ruling Clears Way for Malkin, Penguins, PITT. TRIB.-
REV., Nov. 16, 2006, at C3. Judge Preska believed that the timing of the suit's
filing was merely to inconvenience the NHL and its teams and was an effort
directed to extracting a larger sum of money. Id. Judge Preska also ruled
accordingly against Lokomotiv Yaroslavl in connection with Taratukhin and
Mikhonov, whose suit had been joined to the Metallurg suit. Id.
61. Metallurg claims violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and
"[t]herefore, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under [§ 1 of the
Sherman Act], allegations adequate to show a violation and, in a private treble
damage action, that plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the law requires."
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660
(1961).
62. Metallurg alleges the following causes of action: (1) Tortious
Interference with Contract; (2) Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty;
(3) Tortious Interference with Business; (4) Misappropriation; (5) Unjust
Enrichment; (6) Conversion; and (7) Violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1, and § 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. Complaint paras. 65-117,
at 24-34, ANO Hockey Club Metallurg Magnitogorsk v. Nat'l Hockey League &
Lemieux Group L.P. d/b/a Pittsburgh Penguins, No. 06 Civ. 9936 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
19, 2006) [hereinafter Metallurg Complaint]. As noted, this Comment will
address the antitrust claims made in the seventh cause of action as well as the
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In its complaint, Metallurg alleged facts regarding
Malkin, his contract, and his departure from Helsinki
substantially similar to those discussed above. 63 Metallurg
then alleged that the NHL and the Penguins "knew and
should have known that Malkin was under contractual
obligations to . . . Metallurg when defendants acted in
regard to Malkin. 64 Metallurg stated that it notified both
the NHL and the Penguins several times, beginning on
September 1, 2006, that Malkin was under contract, 65 that
his resignation was not proper under Russian law,66 that
the Penguins' negotiations and subsequent contracting with
Malkin constituted "blatant and deliberate tampering and
interference, ' 67 and also that the arbitration committee of
the Russian Hockey Federation had ruled against Malkin. 68
Despite these notices, Metallurg alleged, the NHL and the
Penguins continued to induce Malkin to breach his contract
with Metallurg, culminating in his contract with the
Penguins, which was then registered by the NHL.69 Metallurg
alleged that these actions constituted an actionable claim
for tortious interference with contract and business
relations.7 0
Metallurg also addressed the expiration of the old
tortious interference claims, though I will consider interference with
contractual and business relations concurrently.
63. See id. paras. 6-15, at 3-5.
64. Id. para. 16, at 5.
65. Id. para. 17, at 5.
66. Id. There is a dispute in this case as to which provision of Russian law
applies, a dispute that will be addressed with the analysis of the tortious
interference claims. See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
67. See Metallurg Complaint, supra note 62, para. 17, at 5.
68. Id. para. 54, at 20.
69. Id. para. 18, at 6. Metallurg also alleged that the NHL and the Penguins
knew well before entering the contract that Malkin was under contract with
Metallurg, independent of the above described notices. Id. para. 19, at 6.
70. Id. paras. 65-72, at 24-25; paras. 84-92, at 27-29. Through these causes
of action, Metallurg claimed damages "in the amount to be proven at trial." Id.
para. 70, at 25; para. 90, at 28. At the same time, Metallurg alleged that "[t]he
services provided by Malkin as [a] professional hockey player are of a unique
character, the loss of which cannot be adequately compensated to... Metallurg,
and . . . Metallurg is entitled to an injunction enjoining defendants from using
Malkin's services in [the] 2006/2007 season." Id. para. 71, at 25; see also id.
para. 82, at 27 (stating substantially the same claim). However, as noted above,
Metallurg lost its claim for a preliminary injunction.
[Vol. 56610
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Player Transfer Agreement as well as the failure of the
NHL and the Russian Hockey Federation to agree on the
terms of a new Player Transfer Agreement. 71 Metallurg
went on to allege that:
[D]efendant NHL and its member clubs decided to play hardball
with the Russian hockey clubs to punish them for the Russian Ice
Hockey Federation's rejecting the New [Player Transfer
Agreement] and to force them to give in to the term [sic] of the
New [Player Transfer Agreement] and, with improper motive and
intent and without legitimate justification and using improper
means, decided to disregard contracts entered into between
Russian hockey clubs and Russian hockey players, including the
Contract here. 
72
Metallurg then described the policy of the NHL, which
instructed clubs that they were free to sign players under
contract, so long as those players secured releases from
their Russian teams.73 Further, Metallurg alleged that,
pursuant to this policy of the NHL, teams would be subjected
to penalties if they negotiated with, or paid release fees to,
Russian teams in exchange for the release of a player.74
These allegations, according to Metallurg, amount to "a
contract, combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade
in that the defendants and the NHLPA are engaged in [a]
group boycott and concerted refusal to deal with Russian
71. Id. paras. 20-22, at 7.
72. Id. para. 23, at 7-8.
73. Id. para. 24, at 8; see also Price, supra note 44 (quoting NHL Deputy
Commissioner Bill Daly's articulation of this policy). Metallurg also cited the
reference to "releases" in the NHL Memorandum as "a scheme, pretense,
subterfuge and a sham concocted to disregard Russian professional hockey
player's [sic] contracts." Metallurg Complaint, supra note 62, para. 28, at 10.
Metallurg claims the Russian Labor Law does not apply to professional athletes
and thus such releases are inapplicable. Id.; see also infra notes 199-204 and
accompanying text.
74. Metallurg Complaint, supra note 62, para. 26, at 9. Metallurg alleged
that these penalties are "the same penalties as provided for in Article 26 of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NHL and NHL Players'
Association." Id. Article 26 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement provides
that an NHL team may be, among other things, (1) fined no less than $1 million
and no more than $5 million, (2) forced to forfeit draft picks, or (3) forced to
forfeit games in the event that a "Circumvention" occurs. NHL-NHLPA
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 27, art. 26.13(c). Under Article
26.3(a), the payment to a Russian club of a release fee for a player may be
considered a "Circumvention." Id.
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hockey clubs regarding player transfers in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act. ' 75 This restraint of trade, Metallurg
alleged, "has [a] predictable and pernicious anticompetitive
effect, and limited potential for procompetitive benefit," and
therefore is per se unlawful.
7 6
II. YOUR MOVE, MR. SHERMAN: THE ANTITRUST CLAIMS
With players' salaries regularly in the millions, 77 and
sports franchises valued at up to $1.5 billion, 78 it seems
undeniable today that professional sports are a national
business, and a thriving one at that. However, when the
worlds of professional sports and antitrust law first
collided, a completely different conclusion was reached. In
1922, the United States Supreme Court addressed the first
of many antitrust challenges to professional sports.7 9 While
the D.C. Circuit had held that professional baseball involved
no transfer of goods in commerce, and thus antitrust laws
were not implicated,80 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
writing for the Supreme Court, stated:
The business is giving exhibitions of [baseball], which are purely
state affairs .... [T]he fact that in order to give the exhibitions the
Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and must
arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to change the
75. Metallurg Complaint, supra note 62, para. 27, at 9-10. Metallurg also
claims that the policy of the NHL "is not immune from antitrust scrutiny." Id.
para. 34, at 12. Those subjects that are immune from such scrutiny will be
addressed in Part II.
76. Id. para. 111, at 33. As a result of these alleged antitrust violations,
Metallurg requested relief in the form of damages, treble damages, attorney's
fees, interest, and costs. Id. para. 119, at 34. Metallurg also requested an
injunction, as described previously, which was subsequently denied. Id. paras.
120-21, at 34-35; supra note 60 and accompanying text.
77. The average player salary in the NHL, as of 2006, is $1.5 million while
those salaries of players in the NBA, NFL, and MLB average $5 million, $1.7
million, and $2.9 million respectively. Richard Hoffer, It's Great to be Average,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 31, 2006, at 56.
78. See Michael K. Ozanian, How 'Bout Them Cowboys?, FORBES.COM, Sept.
13, 2007, http://www.forbes.comfbusiness/2007/09/13/dallas-cowboys-stadium-
biz-07nfl cx mo0913nflintro.html.
79. Fed. Baseball Club of Bait. v. Nat'l League of Prof l Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922).
80. Nat'l League of Profl Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., 269
F. 681, 684-85 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
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character of the business. . . . [T]he transport is a mere incident,
not the essential thing.
8 1
In his opinion, Justice Holmes created an exemption to
antitrust enforcement for our "national game," an
exemption that would withstand two subsequent Supreme
Court challenges8 2 and would remain unaltered for seventy-
six years.8 3 While baseball enjoyed an antitrust exemption,
other sports have not been so fortunate,8 4 and "arguably no
other sector has faced a more haphazard application" of
antitrust laws as has professional sports.8 5 This haphazard
application has resulted from substantially different
application of the antitrust laws to each of the professional
sports leagues and the often odd context in which these
antitrust challenges arise. Recently, the professional sports
leagues have faced challenges to restrictions on television
broadcasts of games8 6 as well as league labor policies.
8 7
Each challenge brings with it a new set of circumstances in
81. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., 259 U.S. at 208-09.
82. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346
U.S. 356 (1953). The Court in Flood, while recognizing that baseball was indeed
interstate commerce, and that baseball's antitrust exemption was an anomaly,
nevertheless reaffirmed the exemption on the grounds of stare decisis. Flood,
407 U.S. at 282-84.
83. In 1998, Congress passed the Curt Flood Act which guaranteed baseball
players the same rights as athletes in other professional sports, 15 U.S.C. §
26(b) (2004), effectively negating the impact of the exemption created in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., 259 U.S. at 208-09.
84. See, e.g., Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971);
Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. Int'l
Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236 (1954). While professional hockey has not yet
received antitrust scrutiny from the Supreme Court, at least one court has
observed that it appeared to be "highly probable and well-nigh a certainty, that
all professional sports operating interstate eventually will be ruled by the
Supreme Court to be subject to federal antitrust statutes." Boston Profl Hockey
Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Mass. 1972). The court in Cheevers
also noted that, because of its distinct international character, "professional
hockey would seem to be the leading candidate for a ruling that it is subject to
the federal antitrust laws." Id. Recall this distinct international character as
described supra Part I.
85. Nathaniel Grow, Note, There's No 'T' in "League" Professional Sports
Leagues and the Single Entity Defense, 105 MICH. L. REV. 183, 184 (2006).
86. See, e.g., Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d
593 (7th Cir. 1996).
87. See, e.g., McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn.
1992); Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
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a sector that is rapidly changing, and the rules laid down in
previous court decisions may no longer be relevant.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has not considered
antitrust challenges in each professional sport,8 8 so district
courts and circuit courts are left with varying precedent in
each jurisdiction.
A. Refusals to Deal, Group Boycotts, and Professional
Sports
The Sherman Antitrust Act makes illegal "[e]very
contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations. '8 9 While Metallurg alleged that the NHL,
NHLPA, and the Penguins are "engaged in [a] group
boycott and concerted refusal to deal with Russian hockey
clubs regarding player transfers in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act" under the per se rule,90 the Supreme
Court has observed that "there is more confusion about the
scope and operation of the of the per se rule against group
boycotts than in reference to any other aspect of the per se
doctrine."91 The reason for such confusion is that "[t]he term
'group boycott' . . . is in reality a very broad label for
divergent types of concerted activity. '92 Despite the
confusion, though, courts have continued to find that when
a group conspires to boycott, and refuses to deal with a
competitor, such conduct is unlawful under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 93
In Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
Federal Trade Commission, a group of clothing designers
formed an organization in order to drive manufacturers out
of business when they copied dress designs and sold them
88. See supra note 84.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
90. Metallurg Complaint, supra note 62, 27, at 9-10.
91. Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 294 (1985) (quoting LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST § 83, at 229-30 (1977)).
92. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976).
93. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941).
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at a lower price. 94 The Guild required retailers carrying the
designers' clothing to refuse to stock products of the copying
manufacturers, while retailers who refused to do so would
be prohibited from purchasing goods from the Guild's
members. 95 In striking down these restrictions as violative
of both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, the Court
held that even if price and quantity were not affected by the
restrictions, such a group boycott is illegal under federal
antitrust laws. 9
6
In a more recent case, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California, the Court found that the multifaceted term
"boycott" as used in antitrust jurisprudence includes
conditional boycotts, punitive boycotts, coercive boycotts,
partial boycotts, labor boycotts, political boycotts, and social
boycotts. 97 The Court stated that:
To "boycott" means "[t]o combine in refusing to hold relations of
any kind, social or commercial, public or private, with (a
neighbour), on account of political or other differences, so as to
punish him for the position he has taken up, or coerce him into
abandoning it."98
The Court then held that sufficient allegations had
been made of a conspiracy between American insurance
companies and British reinsurers to refuse to do business
with other insurance companies covering certain types of
risks, and thus the complaint would withstand a motion to
dismiss. 99
In the context of professional sports, antitrust
challenges based on claims or group boycotts and refusals to
deal often concern either draft eligibility rules or restrictive
standard contract provisions. In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, the District Court for the Central District of
94. Id. at 461-62. Notably, dress designs cannot be protected by either
patent or copyright. Id. at 461.
95. Id. at 461-63.
96. Id. at 465.
97. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 801-02 (1993).
98. Id. at 801 (citing 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 468 (2d ed. 1989)).
99. Id. at 811. The Court also addressed issues of possible conflicts with the
imposition of U.S. antitrust laws on foreign companies, a conflict that will be
discussed later in this Comment.
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California addressed one such eligibility rule.1 00 At the time
the case was brought, the National Basketball Association
(NBA) had two different rules in place requiring all players
to be four years beyond their high school graduation in
order to be eligible for the draft.1 0' Spencer Haywood, the
basketball player whose contract was at issue, had
graduated from high school but had only attended two
years of college, during which he was named an All-
American and also was on the gold-medal-winning 1968
Olympic basketball team. 0 2 After his second year of college,
Haywood signed to play for the Denver Rockets of the
American Basketball Association (ABA), which allowed him
to bypass a similar four-year requirement through a
"hardship" exemption. 0 3 In his first year with the Rockets,
Haywood was named the Rookie of the Year, the Most
Valuable Player, and also led the league in scoring. 10 4
However, a contract dispute with the Rockets led Haywood
to stop playing for the team after that season and sign a
contract with the Seattle Supersonics of the NBA. 05 As
Haywood was still not yet four years out of high school, the
commissioner of the NBA invalidated the contract and
Haywood filed suit alleging a group boycott of players in his
situation. 106 The court found that the NBA's eligibility
requirements constituted an illegal concerted refusal to
deal with a class of players like Haywood.107
An antitrust challenge of a similar age requirement
arose in Linesman v. World Hockey Association.08 Ken
Linesman was drafted by the World Hockey Association's
(WHA's) Birmingham Bulls, but the WHA commissioner
100. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal.
1971).
101. Id. at 1059. If the player did not graduate from high school, the player
had to be four years beyond the graduation of his original high school class. Id.





107. Id. at 1066. The court found the provisions overly broad, absolute, and
arbitrary given that there was no opportunity for a hearing on the player's
specific circumstances before the rule was applied. Id.
108. 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
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nullified the selection based on a regulation prohibiting
players less than twenty years of age from playing
professional hockey.109 Linesman challenged the age
requirement, alleging that such a prohibition was an
unlawful group boycott under the Sherman Act. The court
agreed with Linesman, holding that it was an
impermissible restraint of trade for the WHA to prohibit an
otherwise capable adult from playing hockey in that
league. 110 The court also went on to deny the WHA's
justification that the regulation was an economic necessity
stating that an "[e]xclusion .. .from the market by means
of combination or conspiracy is so inconsistent with the
free-market principles embodied in the Sherman Act that it
is not to be saved by reference to the need for preserving the
collaborators' profit margins.""'
In the context of modern professional sports, it is
necessary for teams and league management, as well as
players' unions, to cooperate outside of the competitive
arena in order to promote on-field competition.11 2 While the
establishment of a uniform set of rules and policies
promotes parity among teams and thereby creates a better
product for sports fans, there is the ever-present danger of
anticompetitive collusion among these entities in order to
get a larger slice of the multi-billion dollar pie that is
professional sports. In response to the antitrust concerns
present in such a situation, some leagues have asserted
what has been termed the single-entity defense. In the case
of challenges under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
professional sports leagues assert that defense; in effect
stating that the league is a single entity, not a collection of
109. Id. at 1317.
110. Id. at 1325-26.
111. Id. at 1322 (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127,
146 (1966)). But see Nat'l Hockey League Players' Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers
Hockey Club, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157, 1162-63 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (upholding
a regulation of the Ontario Hockey League, termed the Van Ryn Rule, that
prohibited any team from having more than three twenty-year-old players on
their rosters while players over the age of twenty are absolutely barred from the
OHL). For a critical discussion of the aforementioned decision, see Mark
Wilkinson, Note, National Hockey League Players' Association v. Plymouth
Whalers Hockey Club: Antitrust's Rule of Reason and the Van Ryn Rule, 50
WAYNE L. REV. 1277 (2005).
112. Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under the
Sherman Act, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 125, 125 (2002).
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teams, and is thus incapable of conspiring with itself within
the meaning of the Sherman Act. 113 Indeed, the United
States District Court for the Central District of California
has held that NHL franchises are not economic competitors
and, therefore, the NHL functions as a single unit.114 Other
courts, though, have held that franchises are in sufficient
competition and do not constitute a single entity. 115
However, a complete analysis of the single-entity defense
and its possible applicability to Metallurg's claims is beyond
the scope of the present examination. 1 6
Notwithstanding the single-entity defense, and in order
to protect against the danger present in allowing competitors
to cooperate among themselves, courts have used antitrust
laws to forbid combinations, in the general economy and in
professional sports, which have joined in a group boycott or
have used concerted action in refusing to deal with an
entity outside of the combination." 7 "Agreements among
competitors implicate one of two antitrust concerns: either
that the agreement will enable its participants to lessen
competition among themselves, or that it will result in the
exclusion from the market of a rival of the participants. ''"18
113. See Grow, supra note 85, at 185.
114. S.F. Seals, Ltd. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969-70 (C.D.
Cal. 1974).
115. See L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d
1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the single entity defense asserted by the NFL by
finding that teams were sufficiently independent and competitive); N. Am.
Soccer League v. Nat'l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982) (rejecting
single entity defense in claim that NFL rule preventing owners from owning
franchises in other sports leagues violated Sherman Act); Smith v. Pro Football
Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting single entity defense in finding
NFL draft rules constituted group boycott); Mackey v. Nat'l Football League,
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding single entity defense inapplicable in suit
by NFL players against league regarding free agency regulations).
116. For a more complete discussion of the single-entity defense, and
particularly its applicability in the professional sports context, see Grow, supra
note 85.
117. The Supreme Court, in some of the most influential antitrust cases of
the twentieth century, slowly defined and "fleshed out the meaning of 'concerted
action' under the Sherman Act." Anderson, supra note 112, at 137 n.112
(describing the Supreme Court's analysis in United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S.
300 (1919)).
118. Kenneth L. Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4 (2002).
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Metallurg alleged that by instituting the policy it did,
the NHL and its teams were agreeing to concertedly refuse
to deal with any of the Russian hockey teams in negotiating
fees for player transfers to NHL teams. However, the
Supreme Court has explained that, under the rule of reason
analysis used in the majority of cases, the legality of such
an agreement or regulation cannot be determined simply by
finding whether it restrains competition. 119 Since all
regulations of market activity bind or restrain, "[t]he true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition."'120 What this means for Metallurg is
that the NHL could be viewed as merely establishing a
framework that promotes competition in professional
hockey, as opposed to engaging in a concerted refusal to
deal or group boycott. This conflict will be further addressed
in Part IV.
B. The Professional Sports Antitrust Roadblock
While the refusal to deal and group boycott cases show
that restrictions such as eligibility requirements may be
successfully challenged under the Sherman Act, challenges
to other restrictions in the professional sports arena may
not be so successful. This is because challenges in the
context of professional sports often involve the intersection
of federal antitrust law and federal labor law and policy.
121
While the Sherman Act seeks to eliminate collusion as
ruinous of competition, 122 national labor policy promotes
unionization and collective bargaining, despite the inherent
collusion necessary in those processes, as a procompetitive
means to leveling the playing field. 123 In order to resolve
119. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
120. Anderson, supra note 112, at 130 (quoting Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246
U.S. at 238).
121. The federal labor law and policy discussed in this section is embodied
by the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000); the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2000); and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238.
123. See Sean Treadwell, Note, An Examination of the Nonstatutory Labor
Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, in the Context of Professional Sports, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 960 (1966).
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this potential conflict, the Supreme Court has developed the
non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust law when the
challenged conduct involves mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, such as hours, wages, and working conditions. 1
24
Since the players of the four major professional sports
125
unionized long ago, the non-statutory labor exemption has
inevitably entered the antitrust jurisprudence in the
professional sports context. In Mackey v. NFL,126 former
and contemporary professional football players challenged
the NFL's contract restriction termed the "Rozelle Rule"127
on the grounds that it constituted an illegal concerted
124. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, 689-90
(1965) (plurality) (holding a marketing hours restriction exempt from the
Sherman Act when it resulted from arm's-length bargaining and was
"intimately tied to wages, hours, and working conditions"). But see Connell
Constr. Co. v. Plumber & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975)
(refusing to apply the non-statutory labor exemption where labor union
required contractors to hire only those subcontractors that employed union
members as the requirement was not a product of the collective bargaining
process); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (rejecting
application of exemption where employers conspired with mine workers union
to set wages at such high levels as to drive competitors out of business that
were unable to pay those wages); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 810 (1945) (refusing to apply exemption where
union colluded with "employers and manufacturers of goods to restrain
competition, in, and to monopolize the marketing of, such goods"). These
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are dictated by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA):
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000). This exemption supplements the limited statutory
labor exemptions granted by the Clayton Act.
125. The four major professional sports referred to here are Major League
Baseball (MLB), the NFL, the NHL, and the NBA.
126. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
127. The "Rozelle Rule," named after then-commissioner Pete Rozelle,
provided that:
[W]hen a player's contractual obligation to a team expires and he signs
with a different club, the signing club must provide compensation to
the player's former team. If the two clubs are unable to conclude
mutually satisfactory arrangements, the Commissioner may award
compensation in the form of one or more players and/or draft choices as
he deems fair and equitable.
Id. at 609 n.1.
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refusal to deal and a group boycott by denying players the
right to freely contract for their services. 128 While the
district court found the rule per se illegal, 129 the court of
appeals applied the rule of reason and found no violation of
the Sherman Act.1 30 In its analysis, though, the court of
appeals set forth a test to determine the applicability of the
non-statutory labor exemption. According to that test, the
exemption will apply if "[(1)] the restraint on trade
primarily affects only the parties to the collective
bargaining relationship; [(2)] the agreement sought to be
exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining; [and (3)] the agreement sought to be exempted
is the subject of bona fide arm's-length bargaining."'131
However, if one of the three factors is absent, the alleged
restraint may be subjected to traditional antitrust
scrutiny. 132
Four years after the Mackey decision, a similar claim
was brought in the Sixth Circuit and in the context of
professional hockey. In McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., a
hockey player for the Detroit Red Wings had his contract
assigned to the Los Angeles Kings pursuant to an NHL
bylaw much like the Rozelle Rule. 13 3 The player challenged
this assignment as a violation of the Sherman Act. The
128. Id. at 609.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 620-23.
131. Michael S. Kagnoff, While Free Agents Reap Benefits of NFL Labor
Settlement Agreement, Rookies Get Set for Further Legal Battles, 1 SPORTS
LAWYERS J. 109, 118 (1994) (citing Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614).
132. See id. at 123. The Mackey court found that the "Rozelle Rule" was not
a product of a bona fide arm's-length transaction because it was not the product
of equal negotiation, but instead was implemented unilaterally by the owners.
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616.
133. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1195 n.3 (6th Cir.
1979). The NHL rule stated that:
Each time that a player becomes a free agent and the right to his
services is subsequently acquired by any Member Club other than the
club with which he was last under contract or by any club owned or
controlled by any such Member Club, the Member Club first acquiring
the right to his services, or owning or controlling the club first
acquiring that right, shall make an equalization payment to the
Member Club with which such player was previously under contract ....




court applied the Mackey test and found that the rule both
primarily concerned parties to the collective bargaining
agreement and involved a mandatory subject of bargaining-
the financial interest that the players have in the ability to
move between teams in the league. 3 4 However, the court
then reversed the district court's finding that the rule was
not a result of a bona fide arm's-length transaction. 135 In
doing so, the court found that all three factors were met and
the non-statutory labor exemption applied.
In 1996, the Supreme Court again decided to address
the issue of the non-statutory labor exemption as applied to
professional sports in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.136 After
the NFL and the NFLPA had failed to negotiate a renewal
of their collective bargaining agreement, the NFL
unilaterally set methods by which development squad
players would negotiate for salaries, a move challenged by
the NFL players as violative of antitrust laws. 137 As a policy
matter, the Court determined that the non-statutory labor
exemption applied to Brown because to find otherwise
would create a flood of litigation and cause the courts to
usurp the position of the National Labor Relations Board.13
8
Despite the fact that the collective bargaining agreement
between the NFL and NFLPA had expired, the Court found
the restraints to be a part of the collective bargaining
process and therefore exempt from antitrust laws. 139 In
doing so, the Court made no distinction between the labor
market as it concerns professional sports and the national
labor market as a whole. 140
134. Id. at 1198.
135. Id. at 1198-200.
136. 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
137. Id. at 233-35.
138. See id. at 247-48, 250. As any law student knows, such a statement by
a court indicates almost immediately the eventual outcome of the case.
139. See id. at 243-44, 250.
140. See id. at 249-50. This distinction made by the Court is particularly
important in the instant examination. Presently, it is not apparent whether the
market for hockey players and the general labor market in Russia are entirely
separate, which may affect how an American court views a Russian hockey
player's contract. See infra notes 199-205, 252-54 and accompanying text.
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In the most recent development, the Second Circuit has
taken the above rulings a step further. In Clarett v. NFL,141
a star freshman running back from Ohio State University
challenged the NFL's draft eligibility rule that players be at
least four years out of high school-or three full seasons
with special application for eligibility-in order to enter the
league. 142 The Second Circuit held that the non-statutory
labor exemption applied to any claims brought by athletes
against their employers, so long as the claim was based on a
mandatory subject of the collective bargaining process. 143 In
doing so, the court stated that "to permit antitrust suits
against sports leagues on the ground that their concerted
action imposed a restraint upon the labor market would
seriously undermine many of the policies embodied by these
labor laws."'144
However, the problem that leagues face when seeking
application of the non-statutory labor exemption is that
they must rely on their respective collective bargaining
processes and agreements to receive the protection of the
federal labor laws. 145 The WHA in Linesman and the NBA
in Denver Rockets both failed to rely on their collective
bargaining agreements and thus the courts in those cases
did not provide any analysis on whether the exemption
applied.146  The problem that the NHL may have
encountered in seeking the application of the non-statutory
labor exemption in Metallurg's lawsuit is that, as opposed
to the collective bargaining agreement, the Player Transfer
Agreement was negotiated with the IIHF. The NHL and the
NHLPA were not bargaining with each other, but rather
141. 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). For a discussion of Maurice Clarett's claim
against the NFL, as well as the applicability of the non-statutory labor
exemption in that case, see Robert D. Koch, Comment, 4th and Goal: Maurice
Clarett Tackles the NFL Eligibility Rule, 24 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 291 (2004).
142. Clarett, 369 F.3d. at 128.
143. Id. at 138. The court, however, refused to further analyze the merits of
any antitrust claim. See id. at 139-40.
144. Id. at 135.
145. See Ronald Terk Sia, Note, Clarett v. National Football League:
Defining the Non-Statutory Labor Exception to Antitrust Law as it Pertains to
Restraints Primarily Focused in Labor Markets and Restraints Primarily
Focused in Business Markets, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 155, 160 (2005).
146. For the discussion of Linesman and Denver Rockets, see supra Part
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were working collectively in bargaining with a foreign
entity to create the Player Transfer Agreement governing
the movement of players internationally. Additionally, the
policy forbidding teams from negotiating player transfer
fees with Russian hockey teams, though penalized through
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, was
arguably unilaterally imposed by the NHL. This problem
will be discussed further in Part IV.
C. Long Arm of the Law: The Extraterritoriality of the
Sherman Act
In addition to the seemingly unpredictable application
of the Sherman Act to controversies in professional sports,
as well as the growing non-statutory labor exemption, an
antitrust suit brought by a foreign entity, like Metallurg,
will assuredly encounter the difficulties of extraterritorial
enforcement of the U.S. antitrust laws. While the Sherman
Act includes language that asserts jurisdiction over
commerce "with foreign nations,"'147 that jurisdiction has
been limited over time. In United States v. ALCOA,148
Judge Learned Hand stated that the Sherman Act "does not
cover agreements, even though intended to affect imports or
exports, unless its performance is shown actually to have
had some effect upon them." 149 The Supreme Court
acknowledged Judge Hand's analysis several years later
when it held that "[a] conspiracy to monopolize or restrain
the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States is
not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part
of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries. 150
However, in the three decades following ALCOA, foreign
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
148. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), superseded by statute, Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, §§ 401-403, 96
Stat. 1233, 1246-47 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (2000)).
149. Id. at 444. This is what has come to be known as the "effects" test of
jurisdiction. See Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust
Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 160 (1999). Earlier in Judge Hand's
opinion, he noted that "it is settled law.., that any state may impose liabilities,
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends." ALCOA, 148
F.2d at 443.
150. Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704
(1962).
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governments began strongly objecting to the expansive
jurisdiction of the Sherman Act and aggressive enforcement
by U.S. courts. 15
1
Following this foreign backlash, the Ninth Circuit
attempted to limit ALCOA's effects test, as it was "by itself...
incomplete because it fails to consider other nations'
interests. ' 152 Instead, the Timberlane court adopted a
balancing test that involved consideration of factors like
conflicting laws of different nations, location of the parties,
effects of the conduct as felt in the United States and
elsewhere, and the foreseeability of those effects. 153 These
factors sought to take into account concerns over foreign
relations and international comity, so as to temper the
effect of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement.
Congress soon responded to the uncertainty in such
enforcement by amending the Sherman Act through the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA)154 in
1982. The FTAIA provided that the Sherman Act would niot
apply to international commerce, except import commerce,
unless:
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or commerce with foreign
nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States;
and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under [federal antitrust laws],
other than this section. 155
It is important to note that the FTAIA specifically excluded
151. Griffin, supra note 149, at 160-61 (noting that such objections took the
form of preventive legislation, diplomatic protests, and reactionary court
decisions); see also id. at 160 n.6 (describing several cases exemplifying the
aggressive extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act).
152. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 611-12 (9th Cir.
1976).
153. See id. at 614.
154. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act § 402. The FTAIA also
amended the Federal Trade Commission Acts. Id. § 403.
155. Id. § 402.
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import trade and commerce from its restrictive reach.156
In Hartford Fire Insurance, the London reinsurers
moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of international
comity, as described in Timberlane, stating that a U.S.
court should not exercise jurisdiction over wholly foreign
conduct that was lawful where it occurred. 157 However,
when the case came before the Supreme Court, Justice
Souter, in light of the FTAIA, refused to analyze the
exercise of antitrust jurisdiction based on international
comity. 158 The Court also declined to consider international
comity because the London reinsurers did not argue that a
conflict existed which prevented them from complying with
both U.S. and British laws.159
In 2004, the Supreme Court set forth the standard for
extraterritorial antitrust enforcement in Empagran.6o That
case involved a worldwide cartel of vitamin manufacturers
and distributors engaged in a price-fixing scheme which led
to higher vitamin prices in the United States and Ecuador,
though independent of each other. 161 The case was brought
as a class action "on behalf of foreign and domestic
156. The original bill for the FTAIA referred only to "export trade or export
commerce," but was amended "deliberately to include commerce that did not
involve American exports but which was wholly foreign." F. Hoffmann-LaRoche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 163 (2004) (quoting H.R. 5235, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 1 (1981)). As the Court stated:
The Subcommittee's 'export' commerce limitation appeared to make the
amendments inapplicable to transactions that were neither import nor
export, i.e., transactions within, between, or among other nations ....
Such foreign transactions should, for the purposes of this legislation, be
treated in the same manner as export transactions-that is, there
should be no American antitrust jurisdiction absent a direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce or
a domestic competitor.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 9-10 (1982), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2494-95).
157. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 484 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd,
938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
158. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 798. Justice Souter stated that, even
if accepted as true, "international comity would not counsel against exercising
jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged here." Id.
159. See id. at 798-99.
160. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
161. See id. at 159.
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purchasers of vitamins,"1162 but the petitioners moved to
dismiss the case as to the foreign complainants under the
FTAIA's bar to antitrust jurisdiction. 163 The district court
granted the motion to dismiss, but the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that since an injured domestic
customer could have brought an antitrust action, the
FTAIA was inapplicable. 164
On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose
of the FTAIA as "[seeking] to make clear to American
exporters (and to firms doing business abroad) that the
Sherman Act does not prevent them from entering into
business arrangements . . . however anticompetitive, as
long as those arrangements adversely affect only foreign
markets.' 1 65 The Court explained that the text and
legislative history of the FTAIA show that only foreign
conduct which has a direct, substantial, reasonably
foreseeable, and harmful antitrust effect domestically may
be subject to the Sherman Act. 166 The Court then
questioned "[w]hy should American law supplant, for
example, Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own
determination about how best to protect Canadian or
British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive
conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian or British
or Japanese or other foreign companies?' ' 67 The Court
distinguished the independent adverse foreign effect from
the adverse domestic effect and held that no exception to
the FTAIA existed, thus rendering the Sherman Act
inoperable against the foreign defendants. 68 The Court did,
however, note that comity concerns did factor into its
162. Id.
163. See id. at 159-60.
164. See id. at 160.
165. Id. at 161.
166. Id. at 161-62.
167. Id. at 165.
168. See id. at 164; cf. Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.P.A. v. Exxon
Research & Eng'g Co., [1977] 1 Trade Cases (CCH) 61, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(allowing an Italian firm to proceed against an American firm since the purely
foreign injury was "inextricably bound up with the domestic restraints of trade,"
and that the injury occurred "by reason of an alleged restraint of our domestic
trade"), available at No. 75 Civ. 5828-CSH, 1977 WL 1353, at *11-12
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interpretation of the FTAIA. 169
The problem with bringing a foreign entity into an
American court is that the set of activities complained of,
and alleged to be illegal, will usually have taken place
partially, if not entirely, outside of the United States. In
addition, courts are reluctant to assert American power
over foreign citizens and entities in light of international
comity and diplomatic concerns. However, the
circumstances surrounding Metallurg's complaint are
inapposite. Metallurg's lawsuit presents a different scenario
that does not fall within the legal strictures described in
Timberlane, Hartford Fire Insurance, and Empagran.
Instead of a domestic citizen complaining of conduct by a
foreign entity, Metallurg-a foreign sports team-sought
the protection of the American court system from the
conduct of an American corporate citizen that acts on both a
domestic and international level. This would appear to
obviate any concerns for international comity due to
Metallurg's choice of seeking a remedy. However, there still
remains the issue of whether an American court has
jurisdiction over allegedly anti-competitive conduct
committed abroad. That issue will be discussed in Part IV.
III. HANDS OFF!: TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH
CONTRACTUAL OR BUSINESS RELATIONS
"Nobody has ever thought, so far as we can find, that in
the absence of some monopolistic purpose every one has not
the right to offer better terms to another's [employee], so
long as the latter is free to leave."170 The tort of intentional
interference with contractual relations is a widely
recognized cause of action for a party who is injured by a
third party's intentional and improper interference with the
rights under a contract with another party.171 But why a
tort claim instead of a traditional contractual remedy
claim? The reason for this is to protect the rights of a
contracting party where a traditional contract remedy may
be insufficient for that party or where the remedy may be
169. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 169.
170. Triangle Film Corp. v. Artcraft Pictures Corp., 250 F. 981, 982 (2d Cir.
1918).
171. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 129, at 978 (5th ed. 1984).
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inexistent, as is the case with the doctrines of efficient
breach 172 and impracticability. 173
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
cause of action for "inducement of breach of contract" began
in 1853174 with the decision in Lumley v. Gye. 175 The
plaintiff in that case was a theater owner who had
contracted with a singer to perform at his theater. 176 The
defendant, owner of a competing theater, induced the singer
to break her contract and instead perform at the
defendant's theater.177 Although no violence, fraud, or
defamation was alleged, the court found for the plaintiff on
the basis of English law regarding the enticement of
servants from their masters. 178 However, this presented a
new development in English law as no tortious act was used
by the defendant against the singer to induce the breach of
contract. 179
In modern law, a prima facie case of tortious
interference is made when the plaintiff shows that (1) a
valid contract existed between the plaintiff and a third
party; (2) the defendant had knowledge of that contract; (3)
172. See Clark A. Remington, Intentional Interference with Contract and the
Doctrine of Efficient Breach: Fine Tuning the Notion of the Contract Breacher as
Wrongdoer, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 647-48 (1999) (discussing the doctrine of
efficient breach and arguing that contract remedies may encourage breach by
allowing a party to quit performance of the contract in favor of paying less-
imposing damages).
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1979) ("Where, after a
contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault
by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that
performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate
the contrary."); see also Krell v. Henry, (1903) 2 K.B. 740, 748 ("[W]here, from
the nature of the contract, it appears that the parties must from the beginning
have known that it could not be fulfilled unless . . . some particular specific
thing continued to exist, . . . the contract is not to be considered a positive
contract, but as subject to an implied condition and the parties shall be excused
in case, before breach, performance becomes impossible from the perishing of
the thing without default of the contractor.").
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. c (1997).
175. (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.).






the defendant, with improper motive, intentionally induced
the third party to breach his contract with the plaintiff; and
(4) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of that
breach. 180 The defendant's knowledge of the contract,
however, is not enough if the defendant is unaware that he
is interfering with the third party's performance of the
contract.181 Additionally, the inducement must be such that
it causes the effect that was specifically intended.182
However, a defendant may induce the breach of a contract
through a refusal to deal. "Thus A may induce B to break
his contract with C by threatening not to enter into, or to
sever, business relations with B unless B does break the
contract." 18 3 While the general rule is that anyone may
refuse to do business with any other person, such a refusal
may constitute tortious interference if the refusal is solely
intended to cause the other person to break his contract
with a third person.18
4
A peculiar situation arises when, as is the case in many
instances, the employment of a party is terminable at
will. 85 Even though an employee may terminate his
contract with his employer at any point and for any reason
he so chooses, this does not actually act as a bar to a claim
for tortious interference with contractual, or business,
relations. 8 6 "Until he has so terminated [the employment
contract], the contract is valid and subsisting, and the
180. See Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp., 612 N.E.2d 289, 292 (N.Y. 1993); see
also Enercomp, Inc. v. McCorhill Publ'g, Inc., 873 F.2d 536, 541 (2d Cir. 1989)
(describing the same elements except for a showing of damages). I use these two
cases to illustrate the elements of a tortious interference claim because
Metallurg filed its claim in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York and because, since the National Hockey League is based in New York City,
any future suit would likely be in the same venue.
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. i (1997).
182. Id. § 766 cmt. h.
183. Id. § 766 cmt. 1.
184. See id. Also, recall Metallurg's allegations regarding the NHL's refusal
to deal with it in connection with Malkin's transfer, supra notes 71-76 and
accompanying text, and the analysis of those legal claims, supra Part II.A.
185. See generally Alex Long, The Disconnect Between At-Will Employment
and Tortious Interference with Business Relations: Rethinking Tortious
Interference Claims in the Employment Context, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 491 (2001).
186. See Agugliaro v. Brooks Bros., 802 F. Supp. 956, 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1997).
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defendant may not improperly interfere with it. '' 187 This is
because an at-will contract generally grants the parties an
interest in future relations, and an interference with those
prospective relations may still be actionable although the
parties have no legal assurance of their continued
existence.188 As many employment contracts rest on the at-
will status of the business relationship, a clash of interests
is created and the parties must occasionally sort out the
controversy in the court system.
In 1996, Sergei Samsonov, a Russian-born hockey
player, came to the United States and signed a contract to
play with the Detroit Vipers of the International Hockey
League (IHL). 8 9 However, Samsonov's former team, the
Russian Central Sports Army Club (CSKA), alleged that
Samsonov was already under contract with CSKA and that
the Vipers, along with Samsonov's agent, intentionally
interfered with CSKA's contractual rights to Samsonov's
services. 90 Both CSKA and the Russian Ice Hockey
Federation informed the president of the IHL that
Samsonov was under contract with CSKA and that he had
not been released from his obligations under that
contract.' 91 Despite these warnings, Samsonov continued to
play for the Vipers and led all IHL rookies in scoring.192
The court then examined the elements of CSKA's
tortious interference claim. First, the court determined that
Samsonov's contract with CSKA was voidable as he was a
minor when he signed the contract. 93 The court stated that
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1997).
188. Id.
189. Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 181, 186
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
190. Id. at 184-85.
191. Id. at 186.
192. Id. The court also noted that Samsonov was projected to be one of the
top picks in the subsequent NHL draft. Id.
193. Id. at 190. Samsonov was fifteen years old when he first signed with
CSKA, and he subsequently renewed that contract when he was seventeen
years old. Id. at 185. Additionally, Samsonov alleged that he was coerced into
signing both contracts upon threat of being pressed into military service with
the Russian Army, though the court did not analyze those claims. Id. at 185-86.
CSKA claimed that Samsonov's father expressly approved of the second
contract, though he did not cosign either that one or the first contract. Id. The
court determined that the Russian Civil Code allowed a minor to void a contract
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"there is no liability for interference with such an
agreement absent employment of wrongful means, unlawful
restraint of trade, or lack of competitive motive,"194 and that
the Vipers only acted with justifiable business motives. 195
The court also found that Samsonov had decided to leave
Russia before signing with the Vipers and that neither the
Vipers nor the IHL were involved in that decision. 96
Finally, the court determined that the IHL was not aware
Samsonov was under contract until it was notified by CSKA
and the Russian Ice Hockey Federation, which notification
occurred after Samsonov began playing for the Vipers. 197 As
the court found no valid contract between Samsonov and
CSKA, no awareness of a contract on the part of the IHL, no
inducement from the IHL for Samsonov to break his
contract, and no improper motive by the IHL, the court held
that CSKA had failed to make a prima facie claim for
tortious interference with contractual relations. 198
While Samsonov's contract was voidable on the basis of
his minority at the time he entered into the contract, a
tortious interference claim made in the United States but
based on a sports contract entered into under Russian law
encounters an even more difficult problem. While sports in
Russia are generally regulated by the Federal Law on
Physical Culture and Sports in the Russian Federation
(Russian Sports Law),1 99 the sphere of employment is more
generally regulated by the Labor Code of the Russian
Federation (Russian Labor Code), which was most recently
amended in 2002.200 The Russian Labor Code provides two
means for an employee to terminate his contract. If the
at will if such contract did not contain the express written consent of the
minor's parent or guardian. Id. at 190 n.9; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766 cmt. f (discussing tortious interference in the case of a voidable
contract).
194. Cent. Sports Army Club, 952 F. Supp. at 190 (citing Guard-Life Corp. v.
S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 450-51 (N.Y. 1980)).
195. Id. at 190, 192.
196. Id. at 191.
197. Id. at 191-92.
198. Id. at 190-92.
199. Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskvi Federatsii [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 1999, No. 80-FZ [hereinafter Russian Sports Law].
200. Kodeks Zakonov o Trude Rossiiskvi Federatsii [Russian Federation
Labor Code] 2002, ch.3, art. 25 [hereinafter Russian Labor Code].
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labor contract is for an indefinite period, i.e., at-will
employment, the Russian Labor Code allows the employee
to terminate that contract at any time upon two weeks
advance notice of doing so. 20 1 On the other hand, if the labor
contract is for a fixed period of time, as many sports
contracts are, the employee may terminate that contract
upon demand "in case of his illness or disability preventing
the fulfillment of the work under the contract, of a violation
by the administration of legislation on labour or the
collective or labour contract, and for other justifiable
reasons."20 2 However, an analysis of the Russian Labor
Code and its commentaries sheds no light on what may
constitute "other justifiable reasons."
While the Russian Labor Code's general provisions
regarding labor contracts is relatively unclear itself, the
problem is further compounded in the context of contracts
for professional athletes. Article 351 of the Russian Labor
Code stipulates that "[1]abour legislation shall extend to...
[several particular occupations] . . . and professional
sportsmen. '20 3 In addition, article 25 of the Russian Sports
Law "defines a contract on sports activities as an
agreement, which is concluded on the basis of the labor
legislation of the Russian Federation. '20 4 However, article
26 of the Russian Sports Law differs greatly from the
Russian Labor Code in that it provides that contracts with
professional athletes remain in effect until their expiration
or upon transfer, which transfer requires the consent of the
original contracting Russian club. 205
The provisions of the Russian Labor Code and the
Russian Sports Law are in apparent conflict. While the
Labor Code allows for the termination of a contract upon
two weeks notice or for "other justifiable reasons," it also
allows for the contracts of professional athletes to be
201. Id. art. 31.
202. Id. art. 32.
203. Id. art. 351.
204. Mikhail Loukine, Legal Regulation of Sports Agents' Activity in the
Russian Federation, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 63, 64-65 (2004). However, it
should be noted that article 351 of the Russian Labor Code, discussed above, did
not enter into effect until January 1, 2005. Russian Labor Code, art. 351
(commentary).
205. Russian Sports Law, art. 26. (unpublished translation, Tatiana Markel,
Executive Publication Editor, Buffalo Law Review) (on file with author).
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governed by the particularities of other, separate federal
legislation. Additionally, while the Sports Law defines an
athlete's contract as entered into under the Labor Code, it
also stipulates that those contracts are in force and effect
for the entire period covered by the contract-again in
conflict with that same Labor Code. Thus, it appears that
any resolution by a U.S. court of a claim based on a Russian
athlete's contract would require a resolution of this
inherent conflict.
IV. HYPOTHETICALLY SPEAKING: METALLURG'S CLAIMS
REVISITED
Though they were ultimately dismissed, Metallurg's
claims present the state of the jurisprudential landscape
regarding the contracting of foreign players in the United
States as well as the relevant conflict that currently exists
in Russian law. As noted above, Metallurg alleged that the
NHL and its teams have contracted, combined, and
conspired in engaging in a group boycott and refused to deal
with Metallurg and other Russian hockey clubs regarding
the transfer of players from their Russian teams to NHL
teams. 206 According to Metallurg, the NHL did this in
response to the failure of Russia to sign the IHF Player
Transfer Agreement and by instituting the policy that
teams would be free to sign Russian players under contract
so long as those players secured releases from their
respective clubs. 207 At the same time, Metallurg alleged, the
NHL enforced that policy by threatening to penalize any
team that negotiated or paid a release fee for any player
individually. 20 8 Metallurg further alleged that the policy of
the NHL had no potential procompetitive benefit, but
instead had a "predictable and pernicious anticompetitive
effect."209
On its face, it would appear that Metallurg's complaint
would be sufficient to make out an initial antitrust claim for
a group boycott and concerted refusal to deal. While neither
the NHL nor its teams sought to regulate player salaries or
206. See Metallurg Complaint, supra note 62, 1 27, at 9-10.
207. Id. TT 23-24, at 7-8.
208. Id. 26, at 9.
209. Id. 111, at 33.
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the output of the product of professional hockey, 210 such
allegations are unnecessary under Fashion Originators'
Guild.21 1 Instead, the NHL, Metallurg alleged, sought to
control the actions of its teams regarding the signing of
Russian players by threatening to penalize a team that
failed to abide by the NHL mandate. That may be the sort
of coercive or punitive boycott discussed in Hartford Fire
Insurance212 and likely falls squarely within the definition
of a boycott laid out in that case.
213
However, Metallurg would not only run into the
amorphous jurisprudence of group boycotts and refusals to
deal with such a complaint, but would also encounter the
unpredictable application of federal antitrust laws to
professional sports, and particularly hockey.214 Assuming
that, as has usually been the case, the court would reject a
single-entity defense by the NHL,21 5 the antitrust claims
asserted by Metallurg would likely be examined in the
context of the non-statutory labor exemption to the
application of the Sherman Act. As mentioned earlier,
courts disfavor holding professional sports leagues liable for
conduct under antitrust laws when that conduct implicates
national labor policy and terms subject to the collective
bargaining process. 216 The current IIHF Player Transfer
Agreement was negotiated with both the NHL and the
210. See San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966,
969 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (finding that, for the purposes of section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the relevant product market is the production of professional hockey games
before live audiences in the United States and Canada).
211. Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457,
466 (1941) (holding that a practice which tends to create a monopoly and
deprives the public of free competition advantages offends the policy of the
Sherman Act).
212. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 801-02 (1993).
213. See id. at 801; see also supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
214. See Michael J. Kaplan, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to
Professional Sports, 18 A.L.R. FED. 489, § 5(e) ("It has been held that there is at
least a substantial probability that the business of professional hockey is
subject to the application of the federal antitrust laws."). The uncertainty of its
application has created only the "substantial probability" as opposed to a
judicial rule asserting the Sherman Act's applicability to professional hockey.
For more discussion, see supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
216. See supra Part II.B.
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NHLPA, 217 the two parties that collectively bargain on
behalf of NHL franchise owners and NHL current and
prospective players.218 However, those two parties were on
the same side of the bargaining situation, which could
negate the application of the exemption as it would no
longer be a bona fide arm's-length negotiation. The Player
Transfer Agreement, as it delineates fees for player
transfers and the process by which players transfer to
hockey leagues in other countries, may be said to implicate
wages and/or working conditions, which are mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining. 219 Further, even if the
Player Transfer Agreement was found not to fall within the
non-statutory labor exemption, a court may find that the
policy concerns addressed in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.-
that it would create a flood of litigation and usurp the
217. See IIHF News, IIHF-NHL Player Transfer Agreement Involving Six
Euro Countries, supra note 30.
218. Cf. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 138 (finding that the
draft eligibility requirements were collectively bargained on behalf of
prospective NFL players). Though the NHL and NHLPA are theoretically on
opposite sides of the bargaining table, it has recently come to light that there
may have been inappropriate cooperation between Gary Bettman, the
commissioner of the NHL, Bill Daly, the deputy commissioner, and Ted Saskin,
the former NHLPA executive director. A series of e-mails between the three
men has emerged showing that the NHLPA's position during the 2004-2005
NHL lockout may have been undermined, thus calling into question the fairness
of the lockout's resolution. See Stephen Brunt, NHLPA Story Written in Secrecy,
Light Being Shed on Daly's Starring Role, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 16,
2007, at R6; Helene St. James, Chelios Berates Bettman, Says More to Come out
in Union Saga, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 16, 2007, at 6D. In a report prepared
for the NHLPA by Toronto attorney Chris Paliare, it was discovered that Saskin
had directed a colleague to access current players' e-mail accounts and
confidential union records to discover, and potentially weed-out, those players
who had voted against the current collective bargaining agreement. See Rick
Westhead, Report "Big Brother" Spied on NHL Players, Fired Executive Saskin
Directed Colleague to Open E-mails, Union Files to Ferret out Dissidents,
TORONTO STAR, May 30, 2007, at S4. After the lockout, the NHL and NHLPA
entered into the previous Player Transfer Agreement with the IIHF, which
would raise the question whether the NHL and NHLPA had the same
inappropriate cooperation at that time. While Saskin was not fired until May
10, 2007, after the new Player Transfer Agreement had been reached, he had
been forced to go on paid leave in March after the allegations surfaced, and thus
was not present when the new agreement was completed. See Allan Maki,
Players Take 90 Minutes to Axe Saskin, Firing Executive Director with Cause
Unlikely to be End of Legal Travails, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, May 11, 2007, at
Si. For the purposes of the analysis here, I will not consider the allegations of
impropriety in examining the non-statutory labor exemption.
219. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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position of the NLRB--cautioned against the application of
the Sherman Act.220
Assuming, arguendo, that the non-statutory labor
exemption was asserted by the NHL, and the policy
concerns just mentioned did not apply, it may be argued
that the exemption would not apply to Metallurg's or
another Russian club's claim against the NHL. Under
Mackey, the exemption will not apply if any of the three
factors of the "effects test" is absent.221 First, the restraint
on trade alleged by Metallurg, and assumingly any other
Russian club in a similar position, may not be said to affect
only those parties to the collective bargaining relationship. 222
While the NHL and NHLPA are the exclusive bargaining
agents for NHL teams and players, it may not be said that
the IIHF is the bargaining agent for the Russian Ice Hockey
Federation, Russian hockey clubs, or any other foreign
hockey entities. While the IIHF is a collective of national
hockey associations that seeks to facilitate international
competition,223 it was ultimately up to each country to
accept and sign the Player Transfer Agreement. As Russia
refused, and the current transfer of Russian players to the
NHL certainly affects the Russian leagues and teams, the
first factor of the Mackey test is apparently absent.
Secondly, and as mentioned above, while player
transfers may implicate mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, such as wages and working conditions, those
subjects may not be said to be collectively bargained
between the parties concerned. As was just noted, an
agreement for player transfers from Russia to the NHL
would have to involve collective bargaining on behalf of
both of those parties. As the Russian Ice Hockey Federation
did not agree to the resolution reached by the NHL and the
IIHF regarding player transfers, it may therefore be said
that the conditions of such player transfers were
unilaterally imposed on Russia by the NHL's current policy.
Therefore, it could possibly be shown that while the
220. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 242, 247, 250 (1996).
221. See Koch, supra note 141, at 297 (citing Kagnoff, supra note 131, at
109-10).
222. See Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (1976).
223. IIHF, IIHF Mission Statement, http://www.iihf.com/iihf-home/the-
iihf/our-mission.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
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agreement concerns mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, those subjects were not collectively bargained
and agreed to, and the Player Transfer Agreement would
fail the second factor of the Mackey test.
224
Lastly, the Mackey test requires that 'the agreement
sought to be exempted is the subject of bona fide arm's
length bargaining.' ' 225  However, the Player Transfer
Agreement was not bargained by the appropriate parties in
this instance, let alone bargained at arm's-length. Thus, it
could conceivably be shown that none of the three factors of
the Mackey test for the applicability of the non-statutory
labor exemption are present, and a claim like Metallurg's
would therefore be subjected to traditional antitrust
scrutiny.22
6
Another possible hurdle for Metallurg's antitrust claim
could have been the application of the FTAIA227 and the
extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act. Ultimately,
Metallurg was a foreign plaintiff alleging conduct that
occurred primarily outside of the United States. However,
the distinction that must be drawn in this instance would
be whether the NHL's conduct may be characterized as
importing Russian hockey players-or, more appropriately,
importing the services of Russian hockey players-in which
case the FTAIA would not apply at all, 228 or whether the
conduct may be characterized as neither import nor export
commerce, which would make the FTAIA applicable.
229
Once again, if the FTAIA were inapplicable because the
NHL's conduct constitutes import commerce, then
traditional antitrust scrutiny would apply.
If, however, the NHL's conduct regarding the signing of
Russian hockey players was deemed to be neither import
224. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.
225. Koch, supra note 141, at 297 (quoting Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614).
226. See id.; Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614, 616.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
228. The FTAIA specifically states that it applies to international commerce
except import commerce. Id.
229. See H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 9-10 (1982), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2494 (stating that "transactions within, between, or among
other nations [that were not import or export transactions] . . .should, for the
purposes of this legislation, be treated in the same manner as export
transactions").
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nor export commerce, 230 the Empagran standard for
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act would
apply. 231 In the case of the applicability of the FTAIA, the
domestic-exception applies if "the conduct (1) has a 'direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect' on domestic
commerce, and (2) 'such effect gives rise to a [Sherman Act]
claim.' ' 232 It would not be difficult to see how bringing a
Russian hockey player, like Evgeni Malkin, to the United
States to play in the NHL would have an effect on domestic
commerce, given not only that professional sports and
players' contracts have been deemed to implicate interstate
commerce, but also the likely endorsement contracts he
would be offered and the NHL's use of his name and image
in marketing. However, the actions taken to bring Malkin
to the United States to play in the NHL were largely
committed abroad, in Russia and in Finland. As recognized
by the court in Empagran, the domestic effect may be
distinguished from a foreign action and effect.233 Therefore,
even if there was a "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect" 234 on domestic commerce, it would be
separate and distinct from the effect on Russian hockey and
Russian commerce. Additionally, as there was a
distinguishable effect on domestic commerce, there would
be no basis for a Sherman Act claim. 235
While Metallurg's Sherman Act claims would likely
have been unsuccessful due to extraterritoriality concerns
had they not been dismissed otherwise, its tortious
interference claims may not have encountered the same
barriers. As noted above, in order to make out a claim for
tortious interference, Metallurg would have to show that it
230. Certainly, such conduct may not be deemed export commerce, so the
only assumption here is that it does not constitute import commerce.
231. See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159,
164-67 (2004).
232. Id. at 159 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(A), (2)).
233. Id. at 164.
234. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(A).
235. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159. As noted by the Court, the fact that a
domestic customer may bring a Sherman Act suit does not prevent the FTAIA
from operating against a foreign plaintiff. As applied to Mettalurg's case, if the
NHL boycotted or refused to deal with a domestic hockey league regarding
player transfers, that effect would still be independent of the foreign effect and
the FTAIA would still likely act as a bar to Metallurg's claim.
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had a valid contract with Malkin, that the NHL and the
Penguins had knowledge of that contract, that the NHL and
the Penguins, with improper motive, intentionally induced
Malkin to breach his contract with Metallurg, and that
Metallurg suffered damages as a result of that breach. 236
Metallurg's contract with Malkin may have been
established with relative ease. When the Penguins drafted
Malkin in the 2004 Entry Draft, Malkin was already under
contract with Metallurg through the 2007-2008 hockey
season. 237 Additionally, Malkin continued to play for
Metallurg, under that contract, through the 2004-2005
NHL lockout as well as the 2005-2006 hockey season. 238 On
August 7, 2006, Malkin signed a new one-year contract
through the 2006-2007 season, shortening the duration of
his obligations to Metallurg. 239 It was this second contract
that Malkin could be considered to have breached by
departing for the United States and signing with the
Penguins. However, Malkin has subsequently alleged that
he signed that contract under duress and only after officials
from Metallurg and the Russian Ice Hockey Federation
followed him to his house late at night on August 7.240 That
alleged duress would present a hurdle for Metallurg in
establishing a valid contract because, under U.S. law,
contracts made through means of duress or coercion are
voidable. 241 If such duress or coercion was not found,
Metallurg would then only face a determination of which
236. See supra Parts I.C, III. As stated by Metallurg in its complaint, it was
damaged "in the amount to be proven at trial." Metallurg Complaint, supra note
62, para. 70, at 25; para. 90, at 28. Also, as noted in Metallurg's plea for an
injunction, Malkin's services are unique, "the loss of which cannot be
adequately compensated." Id. para. 71, at 25.
237. Price, supra note 44.
238. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
239. Neumeister, supra note 52.
240. Dave Molinari, Two Tales of Malkin's Pact with Russians: Penguins
Star and His Mother Say He Was Forced to Sign Contract, PITT. POST-GAZETTE,
Nov. 11, 2006, at Al. Though Malkin was a minor when he signed the original
contract with Metallurg, the subsequent one-year contract was signed after he
had turned eighteen years old, and thus the Samsonov precedent is not
applicable in that instance. See Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc.,
952 F. Supp. 181, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
241. See, e.g., Mitchell v. C.C. Sanitation Co., 430 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex.
1968).
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Russian law governs Malkin's contract 242 before it could
establish the first element of a tortious interference claim.
Also, the second element of Metallurg's claim, that the
NHL and the Penguins knew Malkin was under contract,
could possibly have been established. Though the Penguins
drafted Malkin in 2004, he was under contract with
Metallurg until 2008, and continued to play for Metallurg
for the two seasons following his being drafted. Additionally,
the NHL was unable to negotiate Malkin's transfer in 2005
due to the Russian Ice Hockey Federation's failure to sign
the new Player Transfer Agreement. 243 Further, Malkin's
one-year contract with Metallurg for the 2006-2007 season
was widely reported in news outlets throughout the United
States and especially in Pittsburgh. 244 Thus, it would be
very difficult for either the NHL or the Penguins to disclaim
knowledge of Malkin's contract with Metallurg.
The third element of the tortious interference claim,
though, would likely have been the most difficult element to
establish. While Metallurg alleged that the NHL instituted
its policy regarding transfers of Russian players "to play
hardball with the Russian hockey clubs [and] to punish
them for the Russian Ice Hockey Federation's [rejection of]
the New [Player Transfer Agreement] ,' 245 that would be
very difficult to prove. First, the NHL may have asserted
that its policy, as released in the press, specifically stated
that the NHL teams could sign Russian players only after
that player had secured a release from his team. 246
Secondly, the NHL may have averred, as was found by the
court in Samsonov's case, that it acted only "with the
justifiable business motive of securing a business asset-in
242. As shown above, the provisions of the Russian Labor Code appear to be
at odds with the Russian Sports Law regarding professional athletes' contracts.
See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
243. Notably, if Malkin was not under contract at that point, a transfer
would be unnecessary-the transfer agreement was put into place to regulate
the transfer of players under contract.
244. See, e.g., Price, supra note 44. Though Metallurg also notified both the
NHL and the Penguins of the arbitration committee's ruling against Malkin,
that occurred subsequent to Malkin's signing with the Penguins on September
5, 2006, and would thus be unavailing in establishing this element.
245. Metallurg Complaint, supra note 62, para. 23, at 7-8.
246. See Price, supra note 44.
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this case, a star hockey player."247 However, Malkin's
situation may have been distinguished from Samsonov's
case in that Malkin may not have necessarily decided to
leave Russia prior to beginning his dealings with the
Penguins.248 Indeed, only a day before Malkin signed his
one-year contract with Metallurg, the Pittsburgh Tribune-
Review reported that the Penguins were beginning
negotiations with Malkin's agent to bring him to the United
States.249 Therefore, while an inducement may be shown, it
would have been difficult to establish that the NHL and the
Penguins did so with improper motive given the strong
similarities to the precedent set forth in the Samsonov case.
However, there may have existed at least the possibility
that Metallurg could have recovered damages with their
tortious interference with contractual relations claim.
Though the above analysis regarding Metallurg's claims
ultimately depended on those claims going to trial, the
discussion must remain hypothetical. On January 29, 2007,
United States District Court Judge Loretta A. Preska
dismissed both of Metallurg's lawsuits against the NHL and
the Penguins pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
forty-one.250 Though it took more than two months, many
had postulated that since Metallurg lost its injunction
claim, and declined to appeal that decision, that such a
dismissal would occur.251  Throughout most of this
controversy, much ado has been made regarding the
apparent current conflict in Russian law regarding the
status of professional athletes in that country. Indeed, it
247. Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 181, 190
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
248. See id. at 191 (finding that Samsonov severed his business ties with
CSKA prior to coming to the United States to play hockey). Indeed, Malkin did
not fax his two weeks notice that he was terminating his contract with
Metallurg until he had already abandoned his team in Helsinki, Finland. See
supra note 53; see also supra Part III (discussing whether such notice was
sufficient to terminate a contract under the Russian Labor Code and Russian
Sports Law).
249. Price, supra note 44.
250. FED R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1). The parties to the action filed a stipulation of
dismissal of all claims, indicating that this dismissal was a voluntary one under
FRCP 41(a)(1), though the stipulation specifically states that the dismissal was
done with prejudice.
251. See, e.g., Shelly Anderson, Malkin Big Winner in Court, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 2007, at D3.
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had been the NHL's position that Malkin's contract was
legally terminated by giving two weeks' notice and that,
therefore, Metallurg's claims were unfounded. However,
while Metallurg's lawsuit has concluded, the apparent
conflict in Russian law continues. That conflict between the
Russian Labor Code and the Russian Sports Law could
continue to represent a hurdle for any Russian team
seeking to establish its rights to a player currently on an
NHL team.
The disappointing results of litigation in U.S. courts as
well as the conflict between the Labor Code and Sports Law
brought to light by that litigation has caused a great stir in
the hockey community. During the saga surrounding the
negotiation of the newest Player Transfer Agreement, it
was noted that "NHL clubs are forbidden from acquiring
players already under contract in Russia, but can take free
agents without compensation. However, Russian players
can still easily break their contracts, freeing them to sign
with an NHL team. '252 In protest, Russian Ice Hockey
Federation president Vladislav Tretiak summarized the
conflict and responded that: 'Today it's very simple to take
hockey players. Two weeks and each guy can go. The NHL
every year gets Russian players. If the players want to go to
the NHL then OK, after their contract [ends]. "'253 However,
Tretiak, who is also a member of the State Duma in
Russia-the equivalent of a lower house of Parliament or
the House of Representatives in the United States-
announced that the Russian Labor Law would be
amended. 254 Tretiak indicated that "[t]he new law will
enforce the terms of all Russian hockey contracts and will
require that those contracts be bought out if a player wants
to leave. ' 255 Showing his distaste for the recent trend of
departing players, Tretiak stated: 'If a player runs away,
there will be serious financial reprimands . . . .He will
think twice about doing it.' ' 256
The stipulation dismissing Metallurg's complaint does
252. Russian Hockey Prez Says Clubs Not Happy with Deal, supra note 41.
253. Id. (quoting Vladislav Tretiak).
254. See Russians Turn Down Transfer Agreement, Club Teams Want More
Respect, supra note 42.
255. Id.
256. Id. (quoting Vladislav Tretiak).
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not go into detail or give any analysis as to why it was
dismissed. Regardless, the conflict in Russian law
presented an initial, very substantial hurdle because the
establishment of Malkin's contract with Metallurg was
essential to both of its main claims. If Malkin was not
under contract with Metallurg, the NHL could not have
possibly interfered with such a contract and would not be
obligated to negotiate with Metallurg for the release of
Malkin from that contract.
Even though Metallurg's complaint was dismissed, and
along with it the lawsuits filed by Lokomotiv Yaroslavl, the
legal issues presented by this set of circumstances, and by
the filing of Metallurg's lawsuit, remain and may result in
further conflict. As long as Russia refuses to sign any
Player Transfer Agreement, its teams and those of the NHL
will remain at odds regarding the transfer of players
between leagues and the fees paid for those transfers. The
NHL, like most leagues, seeks to have the best players in
the world playing for its teams and will seek out those
players at a huge expense. 257 Russian teams, however,
would prefer to retain the players that they have recruited
and trained, and may only release those players from their
contracts with the payment of a substantial fee, a fee that
the NHL is unwilling to pay.258 If an NHL team recruits
and signs another Russian player in the same manner that
it recruited and signed Malkin, it would not be surprising if
that player's Russian team filed a similar complaint against
the NHL and that NHL team.
V. FOREIGN PLAYERS IN THE NHL: A NEW PATH?
In September 2006, the IIHF released a study of the
career paths and performances of European hockey players
playing in North American Hockey Leagues. 259 The study
examined 621 players in the NHL and AHL between 2000
and 2006, 93 players that had played in at least 400 NHL
games upon retirement, and 575 players that had been
257. Though concrete figures are not reliably available, one can speculate
that, in addition to the million-dollar salaries discussed earlier, see supra note
77, teams incur great expense in hiring representatives to recruit players and
negotiate contracts.
258. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
259. IIHF STUDY, supra note 18, at 1.
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drafted by the CHL between 1997 and 2006.260 The IIHF
found that many of the players drafted into the NHL, or
transferred there by some other means, were not ready to
play in the NHL and often ended up either stuck in the
minor leagues or returning to their home countries. 26 1
These players simply were not ready to play in the NHL,
arguably the top professional league, as they had not been
adequately trained prior to coming to North America and
did not receive adequate competition in the minor leagues
that would have allowed them to hone their skills. 26 2
However, the NHL seems so eager to sign players from top
European leagues that it squanders the potential of many
talented individuals who are underprepared and then
allows those players to fall by the wayside. Even
disregarding national origin, the seven rounds and 211 total
picks in the NHL draft create great hopes for those players
selected, but "the reality is the [thirty NHL] clubs will be
happy if just a few of their prospects . . .become bona fide
NHL players. '' 263 In other words, the NHL is so actively
searching for the next big star that it is willing to allow the
careers of many players to falter in exchange for finding a
single star. The IIHF proposed, at the conclusion of its
study, that the NHL and minor leagues decrease their
signing of European players by ten percent in order to allow
those players to remain in Europe until they are ready to
play in the NHL.264 To be sure, the IIHF is not proposing
that European players stop signing with NHL teams, but
only that those players do so after they and their skills have
matured to a professional level.
While it cannot be said that Malkin was ill-prepared for
the NHL-indeed, he led all rookies in points in his first
year and won the Calder Trophy as Rookie of the Year 265-
it may be that the NHL is so eager to sign the top European
talent that it will continue to face lawsuits and claims like
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1-2.
262. Id.
263. Spencer, supra note 22.
264. See IIHF STUDY, supra note 18, at 1.
265. See Shelly Anderson, He's Got Hart: Crosby Sweeps NHL Major
Awards, Malkin Rookie of Year in Big Night for Penguins, PIrT. POST-GAZETTE,
June 15, 2007, at Fl.
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those filed and alleged by Metallurg by doing so. While the
NHL has a transfer agreement with most of the European
countries from which it signs players, 19.4% of Europeans
in the NHL are from Russia 2 66-a country that has now
rejected two consecutive Player Transfer Agreements from
the IIHF. The Russian Ice Hockey Federation has stated
that it prefers to negotiate transfers for each player on an
individual basis, 26 7 while the NHL has allegedly forbidden
its teams from negotiating with, or paying a player transfer
fee to, any individual Russian hockey team.268 So long as
this is true, the NHL will continue to face antitrust and
other claims, like those brought by Metallurg and
Lokomotiv Yaroslavl.
Such claims are not new ground for the NHL, though.
In 2005, the Moscow Dynamo attempted to prevent
Alexander Ovechkin, the only player chosen before Malkin
in the 2004 draft, from playing hockey for the NHL's
Washington Capitals.269 Similar to Malkin's case, the
Dynamo obtained an award from the Russian Ice Hockey
Federation's arbitration committee finding Ovechkin in
breach of his contract and banning him from playing for any
other club for the 2005-2006 season.270 However, what the
Dynamo and the arbitration committee saw as a contract
renewal, the court found was merely a series of unanswered
letters and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 271 Still, one of the NHL's brightest stars, and
eventual Rookie of the Year, was brought to court by his
Russian team seeking to stop, or at least stall, the
beginning of his NHL career. Russian teams have also
sought to stop Ovechkin's teammate Alexander Semin as
well as Nikolai Zherdev from playing in the NHL through
arbitration proceedings. 272 When Ovechkin's, Semin's, and
Zherdev's cases are considered, the NHL faced four lawsuits
266. See IIHF STUDY, supra note 18, at 5.
267. See Russians Turn Down Transfer Agreement, Club Teams Want More
Respect, supra note 42.
268. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
269. See Dynamo v. Ovechkin, 412 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2006).
270. Id. at 26.
271. Id. at 29.
272. See Defiant Russia Rejects Player Transfer Agreement, CHINA DAILY,
May 11, 2007, at 23.
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and two arbitration proceedings in two years regarding its
teams' signing of high profile Russian hockey players. That
represents a dramatic trend that will only continue if both
the NHL and the Russian Ice Hockey Federation continue
their respective current policies regarding player transfers
between the leagues. Indeed, despite the unsuccessfulness
they have had thus far, Tretiak has stated that Russian
hockey teams "would not back away from further legal
challenges." 273
When it comes to hockey, the United States and Russia
have never really been on friendly terms. At the 1980
Olympic Games in Lake Placid, New York, the U.S. men's
hockey team defeated the Soviet team in the semi-finals in
what has been named the "Miracle on Ice. ' 274 Walt Disney
Studios even recently made that story into a full-length
motion picture. 275 It seems almost odd that the semi-final
game has become the stuff of legends, while the final game,
in which the United States defeated Finland to win the gold
medal, has seemingly been dropped from the story.
However, the importance of the "Miracle on Ice" rested
largely with the existence of the Cold War between the
United States and the Soviet Union at that time. It seems
that now, a new Cold War may be starting between the
NHL and the Russian Ice Hockey Federation, one that can
be very dangerous to the careers of the hockey players
caught in the feud between the two leagues.
Indeed, a backlash to the recent lawsuits and Russia's
refusal to sign the new Player Transfer Agreement may be
starting. While a record thirty percent of the players
selected in the 2007 NHL draft were American, 276 only nine
Russian players were taken, the lowest number selected
from that country since 1988.277 Additionally, those
Russians that were drafted were selected much lower than
expected. For example, Alexei Cherepanov broke six-time
NHL All-Star Pavel Bure's rookie scoring record while
273. Id.
274. Russell Levine, A Look Back at the "Miracle": U.S. Shocks Soviets,
NHL.COM, Feb. 22, 2000, http://www.nhl.com/nhl/app?service=page&page=
NewsPage&articleid=279285.
275. MIRACLE (Walt Disney 2004).




playing for Omsk in Russia's elite league.278 Generally
referred to as the top European skater in the draft because
of his great skill, Cherepanov had been projected as a top-
five draft pick.279 However, fearing that it would be difficult
to bring Cherepanov to the United States to play, many
NHL teams passed on the opportunity to draft him.28 0
Indeed, Cherepanov has stated that he will play another
season with his Omsk club instead of coming to the United
States immediately.28 1
While it is possible that the IIHF study and not
Russia's absence from the Player Transfer agreement
contributed to the changes in this year's NHL draft, two
other facets of the backlash may not be said to be subject to
such debate. In the first instance, Tretiak proposed to the
NHL his idea of staging another Summit Series-an eight-
game exhibition series between hockey players from Russia
and Canada that was originally held in 1972.282 Tretiak
claimed to have the support of both Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen
Harper 28 3 and cited this proposal as evidence of his
willingness to negotiate with the NHL. 28 4 However, Bill
Daly, the NHL deputy commissioner, rejected the proposal,
stating that staging such an event would be neither
practical nor possible.28 5 Daly then went on tell Tretiak that
278. See Kane Becomes Second Straight U.S.-Born Player Selected First,
supra note 22.
279. Pierre LeBrun, Three Under Hawks' Gaze: Chicago Sizing Up Turris,
Kane and vanRiemsdyk with the No. 1 Pick, THE HAMILTON SPECTATOR, May 31,
2007, at SP6.
280. See Kane Becomes Second Straight U.S.-Born Player Selected First,
supra note 22. Teams had similar concerns with Ruslan Bashkirov: "The risk
with Russian winger Ruslan Bashkirov, taken [sixtieth] overall, isn't with his
skill. He's got loads of talent. The risk is wondering whether they'll get him in a
Senators uniform given Russia's absence from the NHL-IIHF player transfer
agreement." Senators Take Chance on Talented Russian Winger, WINNIPEG
FREE PRESS, June 24, 2007, at C5.
281. Kane Becomes Second Straight U.S.-Born Player Selected First, supra
note 22.
282. Eric Duhatschek, NHL Says Nyet to Russia-Canada Series, TORONTO
GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 30, 2007, at S1.
283. Id.
284. See Russians Turn Down Transfer Agreement, Club Teams Want More
Respect, supra note 42.
285. See Duhatschek, supra note 282.
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"the NHL is looking 'forward to concluding . . . a new
NHL/IIHF player-transfer agreement.' 28 6 The presence of
the rejection of Tretiak's proposal juxtaposed with the
endorsement of the Player Transfer Agreement indicates
that the two are not unrelated.
The second facet of the backlash, or rather, a backlash-
to-the-backlash, involves a wave of players leaving NHL or
AHL teams to play for Russian hockey teams, often for
higher salaries, since the Russian leagues do not operate
under a salary cap. 28 7 Within a period of a few weeks in
October 2007, it was announced that a handful of players
were leaving, either fed up with playing in the minor
leagues or just seeking a different opportunity to play
hockey. Upon being assigned to the Peoria Rivermen of the
AHL-after playing five seasons with the NHL's St. Louis
Blues-Petr Cejanek announced he would return to Russia
to play for Ak Bars Kazan of the Russian Super League. 288
Joining Cejanek on Ak Bars Kazan will be Roman
Voloshenko, the Minnesota Wild's second-round pick in the
2004 draft who played two seasons with the Wild's AHL
affiliate, the Houston Aeros. 28 9 Igor Girgorenko left the
Detroit Red Wings' affiliate in Grand Rapids for the
Russian leagues, where he will make $1 million tax-free as
opposed to the $70,000 he would have made staying in
Grand Rapids. 290 Most notably, though, are Alexander
Svitov, 291  Alexei Yashin, 292  and eight-year veteran
goaltender Robert Esche, 293 who all left NHL careers
286. Id. (quoting NHL deputy commissioner Bill Daly).
287. See Michael Farber, Cold Shoulder, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 15, 2007,
at 70.
288. See Jeremy Rutherford, Cejanek is Going to Russia, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Oct. 21, 2007, at D12. Notably, Ak Bars Kazan "will compensate the
Blues for close to half of Cejanek's $2 million salary." Id.
289. See John Shipley, Voloshenko Heads Home, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Oct. 14, 2007, at C17. Unlike Cejanek, however, the reports of Voloshenko going
to Ak Bars Kazan noted that the Wild would not receive compensation because
of the lack of a player transfer agreement between the NHL and the Russian
league. See id.
290. Ansar Khan, Grigorenko Bids GR Goodbye, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Oct.
22, 2007, at C6.
291. See Farber, supra note 287.
292. See id.
293. Biron, Flyers Blank Atlanta, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 2007, at D3.
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behind to sign with Russian Super League teams. While it
may be the case that some of these players truly were not
ready for NHL play,294 as was observed by the IIHF study,
that certainly cannot be said of the veteran players who are
leaving NHL careers behind for higher Russian salaries.
Regardless, the departure of these players from NHL and
minor league teams while under contract shows that every
action-e.g., Malkin, Ovechkin, Semin-has an equal and
opposite reaction.
Despite the bitter relations, backlash, and counter-
backlash between the NHL and the Russian hockey
leagues, litigation should not always be the answer. The
costs of defending or settling antitrust lawsuits, like
Metallurg's, are staggering and are generally measured in
millions of dollars.295 In the case of Maurice Clarett's
lawsuit, the NFL spent nearly $1 million just defending the
injunction sought by Clarett.296 Additionally, if an antitrust
Esche will also be playing for Ak Bars Kazan along with Cejanek and
Voloshenko. Id.
294. See Farber, supra note 287 (explaining that the Russian Super League
"is a legitimate alternative for middle-of-the-road Russian players" and that
some NHL teams and coaches "are fed up with what they consider high-
maintenance players and hope the door doesn't smack them on the way out").
Farber also noted that "[s]ome high-profile Russian players have been notable
busts in recent years (Chicago's Sergei Samsonov, Montreal's Alexei Kovalev)."
Id. The reason for this may be the change in the American game from one
dependent on finesse to one that is more physical. "There aren't many Russians
who play that style. They're not trained that way. They're trained to
stickhandle and pass." Id. Indeed, Minnesota Wild's general manager Doug
Riseborough commented upon Voloshenko's departure that his 'theory is,
there's a lot of players who need to play three, four years in the minors before
they become good players, and if I thought he was that good, he would have
been in the NHL."' Shipley, supra note 289.
295. See Hoover's In-Depth Company Records, Northrop Grumman
Corporation, Jan. 3, 2007 (stating that in December 2006, Honeywell paid
Northrop Grumman Corporation $440 million to settle antitrust and patent
infringement claims), available at 2007 WLNR 87003; Shannon P. Duffy, Auto
Paint Antitrust Suit Nets $105 Million, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 4, 2007, at
3, 3 (noting that the total recovery in the Auto Paint Antitrust Claims were over
$105 million); Greg Stohr, Justices Question Antitrust Award, SEATTLE TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2006, at C1 (citing a case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court in
which the plaintiffs were awarded $79 million for claims against
Weyerhaeuser).
296. See Mark Fass, NFL May Sue Insurer Over Costs of Clarett Defense,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 2006, at 1. The NFL, though, was later able to recover
$850,000 from its insurer as reimbursement for the cost of defending that
action. Howard B. Epstein & Theodore A. Keyes, NFL Goes Back to Basics to
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suit doesn't settle and the plaintiff is awarded damages,
those damages are trebled under antitrust laws, forcing the
defendant to pay three times the damages found by the
jury.297 Further, not only are the costs of defending such
suits enormous, antitrust trials are extremely long in their
duration, many times taking years, or even decades, to
complete. 298 Though these figures may make an antitrust
lawsuit even more attractive to Russian hockey teams, and
even more inconvenient to the NHL and its teams, it will
likely not settle the real issue-that of player transfers-
anytime soon.
In the absence of a Player Transfer Agreement between
the NHL and the Russian Ice Hockey Federation, it may
behoove the NHL and its teams to negotiate with Russian
teams for individual players. Certainly, Russia will
continue to churn out talented hockey players that
represent attractive prospects to the NHL teams-indeed
both Ovechkin and Malkin were named Rookies of the Year.
While the IIHF study showed that the NHL appeared to be
accelerating its signings of European hockey players, many
of whom come from Russia, the most recent NHL draft
appears to regress from that, though mainly due to the
difficulty encountered in getting Russian players to the
United States. However, NHL teams will still seek out the
best prospects regardless of nationality, 299 and under the
NHL's current policy of refusing to negotiate player transfer
fees, and forbidding its teams from doing the same, the
types of antitrust and tortious interference lawsuits filed by
Metallurg and Lokomotiv Yaroslavl will continue to arise.
Indeed, Vladislav Tretiak stated that the litigation losses to
Win Clarett and Extra Point, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 1, 2007, at 1.
297. Section 4 of the Clayton Act states that "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000);
see also Stohr, supra note 295 (noting that the $79 million antitrust award
against Weyerhaeuser was the result of trebled damages awarded to the
plaintiffs).
298. See, e.g., Hoover's In-Depth Company Records, supra note 295 (noting
that the suit against Honeywell, though finally settled in December 2006, was
filed in 1990).
299. The best example of this came during the 2007 NHL draft, when the
Chicago Blackhawks selected Akim Aliu fifty-sixth overall-Aliu is from
Nigeria, hardly a traditional hockey market. See Spencer, supra note 22.
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date would not deter further litigation.300
Russia's refusal to sign the Player Transfer Agreement
may simply be an inefficient hold-out presenting a large
roadblock to an efficient system of player transfers between
Europe and the United States. The costs of litigating these
matters not only affect the NHL teams, but also the
Russian teams that file them. If another Russian team were
to bring a lawsuit against the NHL, some attorneys would
be particularly less inclined to do so on, for instance, a
contingency fee basis given the unsuccessfulness of those
challenges so far. Additionally, a more fluid system would
result if Russian teams were to allow players to transfer
under the current agreement because, as evident in the
counter-backlash, the players will also flow freely from the
American minor leagues back to Russia. Many Russian
hockey teams, with budgets of up to $60 million, are more
prosperous than their NHL counterparts who are restricted
by the collectively bargained for salary cap.301 With more
money to spend and a freely flowing labor market for
hockey players, more talented players may be enticed to
leave their minor league, or even NHL, teams for a larger
paycheck in Russia.
Despite its inefficiency, Russia is simply unwilling to
sign the Player Transfer Agreement and accept the player
transfer fees fixed by that agreement. The rejection of the
current agreement is the second time that Russia has put
its foot down and insisted on its position. From a pure cost
efficiency stand point, the NHL may be better off paying
higher player transfer fees for certain Russian hockey
players than paying millions to defend antitrust lawsuits
and running the risk of a multi-million dollar settlement or
judgment. Indeed, this may be what NHL teams will be
forced to do if the proposed reform to the Russian Labor
Law is successful and hockey contracts are enforced for
their full terms, closing the loophole that NHL teams have
recently been taking advantage of in getting Russian
prospects to the U.S. The payment of higher transfer fees
would cause NHL teams to be more cautious and
discriminating in which European players they sign,
eliminating, or at least curbing, the problems identified by
300. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
301. Rick Westhead, Nike Calls Timeout, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 9, 2007, at Bi.
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the IIHF Study in the mass signing of European hockey
players.
It would behoove all parties involved to incorporate at
least some or Russia's desires into the IIHF Player Transfer
Agreement. That is why I propose an alternative system to
the current one contained in the Player Transfer
Agreement. European hockey leagues have many levels,
similar to the NHL and its minor leagues. Instead of having
a flat transfer fee for each player in any of these leagues
transferred to the United States, a stratified fee schedule
could be both possible and appropriate. For instance,
Malkin was playing in Russia's Super League, the highest
of Russia's hockey leagues, prior to signing with the
Penguins. The transfer fee set for players from that league
could be substantially higher than from Russia's Premier
League. The higher transfer fee for the better players would
satisfy, at least to an extent, the concerns of the Russian Ice
Hockey Federation and would, again, make NHL teams
more discerning as to the players they sign from European
teams. Additionally, in order to ensure that NHL teams do
not simply pursue only, and all, the best players, a system
akin to the NFL's franchise and transition player tag could
be used. 302 In such a system, each team from the leagues
signing the Player Transfer Agreement would have the
opportunity each year to name one player on its team a
"franchise player" and/or one player a "transition player."
Signing these players would require payment of a
drastically stepped-up transfer fee to that player's current
team, which fee could be in addition to or in lieu of the
transfer fee indicated on the stratified fee schedule. Thus if
the Moscow Dynamo had named Ovechkin its franchise
player or Metallurg had named Malkin its franchise player,
that tag would require the Capitals or the Penguins to
make the top-dollar payments that Russia demands while
allowing teams to pay less for less talented players.
This system also protects each team's revenue by
allowing the retention of the best players for a greater
period of time so that the team can build around that
player's celebrity locally. The higher transfer fee would
force the team to make a real investment in a player, and to
put great consideration into the choice to make such an
302. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION art. XX (2006).
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investment, thus eliminating the great waste of talent that
has come with low, or no, transfer fees. Such a system
would likely result in the elimination of litigation
concerning the recruitment and contracting of these top
players as it would satisfy the financial demands of the
Russian teams without causing teams to pay exorbitant
fees for every foreign player. Further, this system would
prevent Russia's top players from running into the same
plight that Tretiak himself encountered when he had hoped
to play for the Montreal Canadiens as a young goaltender,
but "the 'stupid' government in the Soviet Union wouldn't
let him."3 03 After all, Tretiak's dream is for his grandson to
someday play for those same Montreal Canadiens. 30 4
303. Bill Beacon, Tretiak Proposes Another Summit, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 30,
2007, at B5.
304. Id.
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